



Security Council

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Letter dated 6 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to draw attention to the recently concluded eighth annual joint consultative meeting between members of the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council, held in New York on 6 June 2014.

During the consultative meeting, members of both Councils agreed upon a joint communiqué (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) U. Joy Ogwu
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex to the letter dated 6 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Joint communiqué of the eighth annual joint consultative meeting between members of the Security Council of the United Nations and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union

1. The members of the United Nations Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union held their eighth annual joint consultative meeting at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 6 June 2014.
2. They reaffirmed the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security and the mandate of the Peace and Security Council with regard to the promotion of peace and security in Africa as provided in the African Union Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council. They also reaffirmed the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations on the role of regional arrangements in the settlement of local disputes and recalled the outcomes of their previous consultative meetings. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council reviewed matters of common interest, in particular the conflict and crisis situations in Africa, as well as ways and means of strengthening the partnership between the two entities consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant provisions of the Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council.
3. They affirmed the responsibility of member States of the United Nations and the African Union to comply with their obligations under the relevant agreements in respect of the privileges and immunities of the United Nations and the African Union, respectively.

On the situation in the Central African Republic

4. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council expressed concern at the security and humanitarian situation in the Central African Republic, including recent attacks against civilians and humanitarian organizations, as well as intercommunal clashes involving former Seleka and anti-Balaka militias, which have resulted in harmful consequences to the civilian population, hampered the efforts of the international community to restore peace and stability in the country and worsened an already dire humanitarian situation in the country.
5. They condemned the persistent violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights in the country. In this context, they stressed the urgent and imperative need to end impunity in the Central African Republic and to bring to justice perpetrators of such violations and abuses. They also expressed concern at the dire humanitarian situation in the country and emphasized in particular the humanitarian needs of the more than 550,000 internally displaced persons and of the more than 300,000 refugees in neighbouring countries. They underscored the importance of providing financial support to those countries hosting refugees from the Central African Republic.
6. They recognized that the return of refugees and displaced persons as well as their participation in the political dialogue and elections to be held no later than

February 2015 are conditions for the return of lasting peace and stability in the Central African Republic.

7. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council reaffirmed their commitment to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Central African Republic. They welcomed the positive and important impact of the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA), including in protecting civilians. They also welcomed the deployment of a United Nations operation in the Central African Republic, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), which marks a new step towards a broader and more sustained international engagement in the country. They made an urgent appeal to the international community and donors to mobilize substantial resources for MISCA to enable it to better fulfil its mission and prepare the ground for the smooth transfer of authority from MISCA to MINUSCA on 15 September 2014. They stressed the need for the coordination of efforts between the United Nations, the African Union and the subregion (the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)) in ensuring a successful transition, drawing lessons from previous experiences. They also called for the close coordination of efforts with Operation Sangaris and the European Union mission to the Central African Republic. They further stressed the importance of the effective implementation of the measures contained in resolutions 2127 (2013) and 2134 (2014) to the re-establishment of peace and security in the country.

8. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council called upon the transitional authorities of the Central African Republic to promote political dialogue and national reconciliation.

9. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council welcomed the commitment and the positive role of the international community in resolving the crisis, especially the key role played by ECCAS and its Chairperson, Idriss Déby Itno, President of the Republic of Chad, as well as the efforts of the African Union to resolve the crisis. They emphasized that the continued role of the region would be critical for the promotion of lasting peace and stability in the Central African Republic. They welcomed the extraordinary summits of ECCAS held in Libreville in January and N'djamena in April 2013, which led to the establishment of the Government of Transition in the Central African Republic. They recognized the essential role of the Mediator, Denis Sassou Nguesso, President of the Republic of the Congo, and the International Contact Group on the Central African Republic, co-chaired by the African Union Commission and the Republic of the Congo. They called upon international partners to provide financial contributions to address the many challenges facing the country.

10. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council welcomed the steps taken by the African Union Commission to develop a coordination mechanism between the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army and MISCA, in line with the relevant communiqués of the Peace and Security Council and with relevant United Nations Security Council presidential statements and resolutions.

On the situation in South Sudan

11. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council expressed their deep concern at the political, security, human rights and humanitarian situation in South Sudan, which had gravely deteriorated since the outbreak of violence on 15 December 2013. They underscored that attacks directed at civilians are unacceptable. They called for an immediate end to the violence and for the perpetrators to be held accountable, and reiterated the importance of full engagement in the inclusive peace process mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as well as upholding fully the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement of 23 January 2014. They demanded that all parties allow, in accordance with relevant provisions of international law and United Nations guiding principles of humanitarian assistance, the full, safe and unhindered access of relief personnel, equipment and supplies to all those in need, and underscored the need to strengthen humanitarian responses to populations in need.

12. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council strongly condemned the widespread human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, as well as the incitement to commit such abuses and violations, and emphasized that those responsible for such violations must be held accountable. They noted with deep concern that according to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) report dated 8 May 2014, there are reasonable grounds to believe that war crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed by all parties to the conflict in South Sudan. They called upon the African Union Commission of Inquiry to pursue its work to ensure reconciliation and accountability for violations of international humanitarian law and human rights violations and abuses committed during the armed conflict.

13. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council welcomed the signing of the Agreement to Resolve the Crisis in South Sudan by Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan, and Riek Machar Teny, Chairman of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in Opposition, in Addis Ababa on 9 May 2014, under the auspices of Hailemariam Dessalegn, Prime Minister of Ethiopia and Chair of IGAD. They urged the parties to fully implement this Agreement in good faith, towards an inclusive transitional government, national reconciliation and an open democratic system of governance that can respond to the basic needs of all of the people of South Sudan and protect their human rights. They underscored the importance of ensuring the effective participation of women at all levels of implementation of the Agreement, conflict resolution and peacebuilding. They commended IGAD for facilitating the political dialogue aimed at finding a lasting solution and reiterated the support of both organs in ensuring the success of these efforts. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council expressed their appreciation for the actions taken by UNMISS peacekeepers to protect civilians, including foreign nationals, under threat of physical violence and to stabilize the security situation. They called for the swift deployment and integration of forces from the region into UNMISS to support the Mission and its revised mandate.

On the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

14. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council expressed concern over the fragile security and humanitarian situation which

continues to prevail in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They also expressed concern over the destabilizing activities of armed groups, including the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). They welcomed the end of the rebellion by the 23 March Movement (M23) and the signing in Nairobi by M23 and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo of the documents concluding the Kampala Dialogue, facilitated by Uganda as Chair of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), and stressed the importance of ensuring that all provisions of the signed documents are implemented swiftly and in good faith. They strongly condemned the ongoing violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, including sexual and gender-based violence, and the recruitment and use of children perpetrated by armed groups, and called for the immediate cessation of all forms of violence.

15. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council called upon all signatories and countries in the region, in their efforts to fight against armed groups, to fulfil promptly, fully and in good faith their respective commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region. They urged the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to take further steps to implement their commitment under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, including the establishment of a professional, accountable and sustainable national army that includes a rapid reaction force, in accordance with its commitment to deepen security sector reform and the finalization of the development of a comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and a disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement plan. They reaffirmed their support for the good offices work of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, the Special Representative of the African Union for the Great Lakes Region, the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region and the Democratic Republic of the Congo of the United States of America, and the European Union Senior Coordinator for the Great Lakes Region to support the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework.

16. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council commended the contribution of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), including its Intervention Brigade, to further peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and welcomed the commitment of troop-contributing countries to MONUSCO in fulfilling its protection of civilians mandate.

17. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council welcomed the role played by regional and subregional organizations, including ICGLR and the Southern African Development Community, to find a durable solution to the crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. They called upon international partners to make every effort to ensure that the dividends of peace can be realized immediately through quick-impact projects at the local and regional levels to ensure economic development and to strengthen regional cooperation and economic integration.

On the situation in Mali

18. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council expressed concern over the deteriorating security situation in northern Mali, which continues to threaten the fragile peace in the country. They also expressed concern over the presence of terrorist groups and their gross violation of human rights.

19. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council took note of the signing on 23 May 2014 of a ceasefire by the Government of Mali and the Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad (MNLA), Haut Conseil pour l'unité de l'Azawad (HCUA) and Mouvement arabe de l'Azawad (MAA). They commended the efforts of the African Union Chair and Mauritanian President, Mohammed Ould Abdel Aziz, and the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali, Albert Koenders, in this regard. They urged the signatories to implement the ceasefire fully and in good faith.

20. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council called for the immediate resumption of the cantonment process and of sincere peace talks between the Malian Government and the armed groups signatory and adherent to the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement. They reiterated their support for the restoration of the authority of the Malian State over its entire territory and for a durable political resolution to the crisis and long-term peace and stability throughout the country, respecting the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Malian State.

21. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council reiterated their full support for the inter-Malian process of inclusive national political dialogue and reconciliation. They also reiterated their full support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali and Head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali and the High Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Mali and the Sahel, President Pierre Buyoya, in contributing to the implementation of the ceasefire, the stabilization of Mali and the launching of sincere peace talks on the basis of the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement.

22. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council expressed their full support for the efforts of all regional and international actors to bring long-term peace and stability in Mali. They also underscored the importance of addressing the deteriorating humanitarian situation in northern Mali.

23. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council welcomed the increased mobilization of the countries of the region, including against the scourge of terrorism and transnational organized crime in the Sahel-Saharan region, including through the Nouakchott Process on the Enhancement of Security Cooperation and the Operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture in the Sahel-Saharan Region, as well as the regional ministerial conferences on border security held in Tripoli in March 2012 and in Rabat in November 2013.

On the situation in Somalia

24. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council underlined the importance of their strategic partnership in Somalia. They welcomed the achievements of the current Somali National Army and the African Union

Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) operation and paid tribute to the troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries of AMISOM for their sacrifices and the national army personnel working for peace in Somalia. They commended the first 12 months of operation of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSAM) and welcomed the extension of the mandate. They also welcomed the support provided to AMISOM by the United Nations through the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council underlined that the long-term security of Somalia is dependent on developing the national army. They welcomed contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund for support to the Somali National Army, consistent with the Security Council authorization in resolution 2124 (2013), and highlighted the urgent need for more funding from international partners. They also underlined the need for the Government of Somalia to abide by the terms of the suspension of the arms embargo and to comply fully with all their reporting requirements to the Security Council and relevant sanctions committee.

25. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council expressed concern about the humanitarian situation in Somalia. They underlined the urgent need for funding of the United Nations multi-year appeal, which has received only 19 per cent of the necessary funding. They deplored reports of Al-Shabaab blocking access to those most in need.

26. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council welcomed the recent formation of a new Government and Cabinet in Somalia. They paid particular tribute to the holding of successful elections in Puntland and the subsequent peaceful handing over of power. They welcomed the Government of Somalia's outreach to its regions, with the aim of the timely establishment of an effective federal State, and noted the importance of an inclusive political settlement which underpins the stability of Somalia. They expressed concern about the continued ability of Al-Shabaab to stage and launch operations and underlined the need for swift follow-up in providing basic services in areas liberated from Al-Shabaab, and emphasized the importance of humanitarian access to these areas. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council encouraged the Government of Somalia to complete its "Vision 2016" agenda towards elections by 2016, including achieving key milestones, such as a referendum on the constitution and the formation of interim State administrations, and expressed their willingness to support such a plan.

On the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

27. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council expressed deep concern at the considerable deterioration of the security situation in Darfur during 2013, with continued clashes between the Government of the Sudan and rebel armed groups and an intensification of intercommunal violence, including with the involvement of elements of paramilitary units and tribal militias, which have become the main source of violence against civilians and of population displacement. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council urged all parties to the conflict to cease all acts of violence immediately and to engage in the peace process without preconditions on the basis of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, in order to bring a durable and stable peace to the region. They reaffirmed their support for a Darfur-based internal dialogue and consultations, called upon the Government of the Sudan and the armed groups to

ensure the necessary enabling environment for such a dialogue to begin promptly and in this regard welcomed the formation of the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation Implementation Committee.

28. They commended the efforts of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) towards promoting peace and stability in Darfur, and reiterated their full support for UNAMID in the protection of civilians in Darfur amidst procedural, strategic and operational challenges to its mandate. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council welcomed the revised UNAMID strategic priorities of protecting civilians, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance and ensuring the safety of humanitarian personnel, mediating between the Government of the Sudan and non-signatory armed movements on the basis of the Doha Document while taking into account ongoing democratic transformation at the national level and supporting the mediation of community conflict, including through measures to address its root causes. They noted that the ability of UNAMID to facilitate progress in the implementation of the Doha Document is hampered by delays by the signatory parties and the absence of an inclusive political settlement between the Government of the Sudan and non-signatory armed movements. They urged donors to honour their pledges and fulfil their obligations in a timely manner, including those commitments made at the conference in Doha in April 2013, and affirmed that development can support a lasting peace in Darfur.

29. They strongly condemned the attack on UNAMID facilities in Kabkabiya, Northern Darfur, on 24 May 2014, which resulted in the killing of a Rwandan peacekeeper, and expressed their condolences to the family of the fallen peacekeeper and the Government of Rwanda.

30. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council welcomed the announcement by President Bashir on 27 January of a national dialogue, and noted that the modalities of such a dialogue should provide an opportunity to address the legitimate grievances of the people of Darfur. They looked forward to further developments towards the implementation of an inclusive dialogue process and stressed the importance of the effective participation of women in this process, and in efforts towards peace in Darfur. They expressed satisfaction with the efforts made by the African Union-United Nations Joint Special Representative for Darfur, Joint Chief Mediator and Head of UNAMID, Mohammed Ibn Chambas, in bridging the gap between the Government and the non-signatory rebel groups in the promotion of national dialogue. They also welcomed the joint efforts of the Joint Chief Mediator and the African Union High-level Implementation Panel to facilitate an inclusive process and encouraged them, within their respective mandates, to continue coordinating their efforts to ensure effective synergy.

On cooperation in combating terrorism in Africa

31. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council affirmed that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations and whenever and by whomsoever committed. They highlighted the need for States to cooperate closely during incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups in accordance with applicable international law and for all States to

afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts. They called upon all member States to prevent terrorists from benefiting directly or indirectly from ransom payments or from political concessions and to secure the safe release of hostages. In this regard, they acknowledged the important role of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa and the efforts of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism.

32. They called upon all States to continue international efforts to enhance dialogue and broaden understanding among civilizations in an effort to prevent the indiscriminate targeting of different religions and cultures, and to take all measures as may be necessary and appropriate and in accordance with their obligations under international law to counter incitement of terrorist acts motivated by extremism and intolerance and to prevent the subversion of educational, cultural and religious institutions by terrorists and their supporters.

33. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council considered intelligence information sharing and sanctions as important tools in countering terrorism, and underlined the importance of prompt and effective implementation of the relevant resolutions, in particular Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), as key instruments in the fight against terrorism. In this context, they welcomed the decision of 22 May 2014 by the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities to include Boko Haram on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List.

34. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council underscored that the long-term fight against terrorism must adopt a comprehensive approach by dealing with the challenges of increased economic growth, promoting good governance, reducing poverty, building State capacity, extending social services and fighting corruption, as well as promoting the culture of peace, dialogue and reconciliation among religions and civilizations.

Strengthening cooperation between the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council within the framework of the United Nations-African Union partnership

35. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council underlined the importance of the relationship between the two Councils in addressing peace and security needs in Africa and welcomed the progress made in this regard, including through regular meetings.

36. They agreed to elaborate further ways of strengthening relations between the two Councils, including through more effective annual consultative meetings, holding of timely consultations, and collaborative field missions of the two Councils, as appropriate, to formulate cohesive positions and strategies on a case-by-case basis in dealing with conflict situations in Africa.

37. They underscored the importance of providing support to African Union-led peace support operations on a flexible, predictable and sustainable basis, including through greater provision of financing by African Union member States and individual donor countries, while reiterating that regional organizations have the responsibility to secure human, financial, logistical and other resources for their

organizations, including through contributions by their members and support from partners.

38. They noted the collaborative efforts in conflict and crisis situations on a number of cross-cutting issues, including through the Framework of Cooperation between the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict and the African Union Commission Concerning the Prevention and Response to Conflict-related Sexual Violence in Africa, adopted in Addis Ababa on 31 January 2014, and welcomed the designation of Bineta Diop as the African Union Commission Chairperson's Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security. They also welcomed the first open session of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on children affected by armed conflict and noted the enhanced collaboration between the Peace and Security Department of the African Union Commission and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict.

39. The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council agreed to convene their ninth annual joint consultative meeting in Addis Ababa in 2015. The date of the meeting will be determined through consultations between the Chairperson of the African Union Peace and Security Council and the President of the United Nations Security Council.

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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for the period from 11 March to 28 May 2014**I. Introduction**

1. The present report gives an account of the activities of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) during the past three months, pursuant to the mandate contained in Security Council resolution 350 (1974) and extended by subsequent resolutions, most recently through resolution 2131 (2013).

II. Situation in the area and activities of the Force

2. During the reporting period, the ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic was generally maintained, albeit in a continuously volatile environment attributable to the ongoing conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic. The most significant violation since the conclusion of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement between Israeli and Syrian forces occurred on 18 and 19 March, when the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) fired into the areas of separation and limitation on the Bravo side, which, according to Syrian authorities, resulted in the death of two Syrian Arab armed forces soldiers and the wounding of 17 others. The IDF fire was in response to what IDF claimed was the placing of an improvised explosive device in the Israeli-occupied Golan that injured four IDF soldiers, one of them severely. Violations of the ceasefire by both sides are set out below. The Syrian armed forces continued to deploy personnel and equipment inside the area of separation and carried out military activities and security operations against armed members of the opposition in the UNDOF area of operation, at times in response to offensives carried out by the armed members of the opposition. Inside the area of separation, the presence of the Syrian armed forces and military equipment, as well as any other armed personnel and military equipment, is in violation of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement. As underscored by the Security Council in its resolution 2131 (2013), there should be no military activity of any kind in the area of separation.

3. In the afternoon of 18 March, United Nations personnel at observation post 73 observed an explosion in the vicinity of a nearby IDF position where four IDF soldiers were walking. At the same time, three individuals were observed standing at some distance from the site of the incident, near the Alpha line, watching the event. Small arms fire ensued from north-east of Majdal Shams on the Alpha side. That was followed by a total of eight artillery smoke rounds originating from the Alpha side, which landed in the immediate vicinity of United Nations observation post 73.



The resulting smoke screen prevented further observation from the observation post. Subsequently, United Nations outpost 32A and observation post 72 heard and observed seven heavy explosions and four rockets, respectively, that landed in the vicinity of a Syrian armed forces position straddling the Bravo line. United Nations personnel at outpost 32A heard another 15 explosions impacting near the position. At the time of the incident, United Nations personnel at observation post 71 observed 10 individuals in a Syrian Arab armed forces communications post north of the observation post looking through binoculars towards observation post 73. Shortly afterwards, four armed persons walked towards observation post 73 to observe from a closer location. The Force Commander was immediately in contact with both the Bravo and Alpha sides and urged utmost restraint.

4. IDF informed UNDOF that their soldiers had observed one person cross the Alpha line in the vicinity of observation post 73 and had sent a patrol to the location. Having crossed through the technical fence, the IDF personnel disembarked from their vehicle and walked towards the location, where they saw three persons, one of whom carried a radio, standing close to the line. The IDF personnel asked the individuals to move away from the line prior to firing warning shots. The IDF soldiers proceeded further, crossing on a safe path through an IDF minefield. IDF informed UNDOF that an improvised explosive device exploded while the third IDF soldier was crossing, injuring the soldier severely and the other three slightly. IDF told UNDOF that they held the Syrian armed forces responsible for this incident. Syrian authorities informed UNDOF that the Syrian armed forces were not responsible for the incident and that the IDF fire had hit three Syrian armed forces positions, destroying one piece of artillery. Later that day, in a meeting with the IDF Chief of Staff and other senior IDF officers, who expressed their concern about the incident, the Force Commander again urged IDF to show utmost restraint.

5. In the early hours of 19 March, IDF conducted airstrikes on three Syrian armed forces locations on the Bravo side. United Nations personnel at Camp Faouar heard aircraft flying from the west to the east, firing missiles, and then heard four heavy explosions approximately three kilometres (km) from the camp. United Nations personnel in Camp Faouar went into shelter. The Syrian authorities informed UNDOF that IDF had conducted airstrikes at several Syrian Arab armed forces locations on the Bravo side. IDF subsequently confirmed to UNDOF that they had carried out the airstrikes. According to Syrian authorities, one Syrian Arab armed forces soldier was killed and eight were injured in the IDF response on 18 March, while one Syrian Arab armed forces soldier was killed and nine others were injured in the airstrikes.

6. The UNDOF investigation into the incidents could not establish whether the explosion that injured the IDF soldiers on 18 March had resulted from a drifted mine or an improvised explosive device. UNDOF found that the impacts around observation post 73 were the result of artillery rounds containing a phosphorous substance. IDF, in a subsequent meeting, informed the UNDOF Force Commander that it had issued instructions to prevent the firing of phosphorous smoke rounds in proximity to United Nations positions in the future. The UNDOF investigation team found that the airstrikes hit a building at an Al-Baath Youth Vanguard Camp, where Syrian Arab armed forces soldiers are located, the compound of a building used by Syrian security forces at the Sa'saa checkpoint and a Syrian Arab armed forces

brigade headquarters nearby, destroying and damaging several pieces of military and civilian equipment.

7. In the context of the clashes between the Syrian armed forces and armed members of the opposition, there were six incidents of firing from the Bravo side across the ceasefire line during the reporting period. Neither casualties nor damages were sustained. On 8 May, in the course of fighting between the Syrian armed forces and armed members of the opposition in the area of Al Qahtaniyah in the central area of separation, east of Quneitra (see para. 14 below), two tank rounds landed on the Alpha side. The points of origin were not observed. On 11 May, UNDOF observed one artillery round landing 300 metres from observation post 51 and west of the Israeli technical fence. On 22 May, one mortar round landed west of the ceasefire line in the vicinity of United Nations observation post 51. During the fighting on 8 May and on the subsequent days, United Nations personnel at observation post 51 on several occasions observed multiple rounds of machine gun fire, originating at times from the direction of Al Qahtaniyah and at other times from the direction of Quneitra within the area of separation, passing in close proximity to the observation post and landing west of the ceasefire line. On 11 May, in one such incident, small arms fire caused damage to binoculars mounted at the observation platform of the observation post. On 7 April, IDF informed UNDOF that two mortar rounds, fired from the Bravo side during the attack by armed opposition groups on Tal al-Garbi, a hilltop position, had landed across the ceasefire line in the vicinity of United Nations outpost 82B. United Nations personnel did not observe the incident. In addition, on two separate occasions, on 23 and 24 April, respectively, a Syrian armed forces aircraft dropped a bomb in the vicinity of Al Rafid village in the area of separation.

8. On three occasions, IDF fired across the ceasefire line onto the Bravo side. On 28 March, observation post 51 heard a loud explosion and observed one IDF tank south of the observation post and six IDF soldiers observing east towards United Nations outpost 60A. IDF subsequently confirmed that it had fired at three individuals trying to cross the Israeli technical fence. On 10, 19, 21 and 22 April, United Nations personnel observed between two and six IDF soldiers briefly crossing the Alpha line in the vicinity of United Nations observation post 73. On 30 April, United Nations personnel observed three armed members of the opposition in the vicinity of the unmanned outpost 60A, one of whom crossed the ceasefire line and cut the barbed wire on the Israeli technical fence to the west of the outpost. All incidents of firing into the area of separation and across the ceasefire line, as well as the crossing of the ceasefire line, are violations of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement.

9. Crossing of the ceasefire line by civilians, primarily shepherds, was observed on an almost daily basis by United Nations personnel on the ground. This included persons digging out and removing landmines, as further described in paragraph 24. On 19 and 22 May, IDF fired warning shots towards shepherds as they were crossing the ceasefire line. Throughout the reporting period, UNDOF frequently observed armed members of the opposition interacting with IDF across the ceasefire line in the vicinity of United Nations position 85. On 59 occasions, particularly during periods of heavy engagement between the Syrian armed forces and members of the armed opposition, UNDOF observed armed members of the opposition transferring 89 wounded persons from the Bravo side across the ceasefire line to IDF and IDF on the Alpha side handing over 19 treated and 2 deceased individuals

to the armed members of the opposition on the Bravo side. On one occasion, UNDOF observed IDF on the Alpha side handing over two boxes to armed members of the opposition on the Bravo side.

10. On 16 April, IDF informed UNDOF that it had observed three individuals close to the Israeli technical fence in the vicinity of the temporarily vacated United Nations outpost 86A, whom they alleged to have placed six improvised explosive devices between the old and new technical fence and requested UNDOF to carry out an investigation. An UNDOF investigation team went to the location, but owing to security concerns, it was considered too dangerous to conduct a full investigation. IDF informed UNDOF that in a subsequent investigation on 17 April IDF had identified eight anti-personnel mines, seven of which were west of the technical fence and one to the east on the Alpha side, and that IDF had exploded the seven mines west of the technical fence in their location and left the eighth one in place. UNDOF continued to observe and report instances of transborder movements of unidentified individuals between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic in the northern part of the area of separation.

11. Overall, in the course of the reporting period, heavy clashes between the Syrian armed forces and armed members of the opposition continued in the UNDOF area of operation. In the northern area of limitation, shelling and explosions were observed in the areas of Mazra'at Bayt Jinn and Bayt Jinn. Fighting remained, however, most intense in the south-central parts of the area of separation and in the area of limitation just east of it, where armed opposition groups captured three strategic hill positions from the Syrian armed forces. The presence and use of heavy weapons and equipment by the Syrian armed forces continued while armed members of the opposition were observed to have additional heavy weapons and military equipment in their possession following the capture of the Syrian armed forces positions. The Syrian armed forces continued to carry out airstrikes in the area of limitation, at times in close proximity to the area of separation. UNDOF observed a larger number of airstrikes towards the end of the reporting period in the area bounded by the Bravo line in the west and the towns of Jaseem and Nawa in the east. The local truce arrangement in the areas of Jabbata, Ufaniyah and Khan Arnabah, in the northern and central areas of the area of separation, generally held although UNDOF observed sporadic firing from Syrian armed forces positions in areas surrounding Ufaniyah.

12. The heavy fighting that had commenced in the UNDOF area of operation at the end of January in the vicinity of the hilltop positions of Tal al-Garbi and Tal al-Sharqi and the surrounding villages in the area of limitation, immediately adjacent to the area of separation, continued throughout the reporting period, interrupted only by short phases when fighting decreased. The area of the fighting extended through the 10-km zone of the area of limitation stretching from Nab'as-Sakhr in the north to Nawa in the south. Small arms fire from inside the area of separation and heavy artillery, mortar, main battle tank, machine gun and anti-aircraft fire from the area of limitation in close vicinity to the Bravo line occurred on a daily basis. As a result of sustained and coordinated attacks by armed opposition groups, the Syrian armed forces withdrew from numerous of its positions in the area of limitation and lost control of the terrain surrounding Tal al-Garbi and Tal al-Sharqi, leaving the positions isolated. The Syrian armed forces sustained the positions by conducting resupply missions by helicopter. On each occasion, UNDOF informed IDF of the activity. The third position, Tal al-Jabiyam, north-west of

Nawa, in the area of limitation, also was besieged by armed opposition groups. On 7 April, approximately 400 armed members of opposition groups conducted coordinated attacks from the north and the south on Tal al-Garbi, supported by artillery fire from what UNDOF assessed to have been up to three tanks in the possession of the armed groups. In the afternoon of the same day, UNDOF observed four black flags on top of the position. Subsequently, many armed opposition members were observed leaving the position. On 24 and 27 April, respectively, Tal al-Jabyam and Tal al-Sharqi were also captured by opposition groups, which in each case was followed by heavy Syrian armed forces artillery shelling onto the lost hilltop positions. In the course of the clashes on and around Tal al-Garbi, approximately 280 individuals fled the area of the fighting and took shelter in the vicinity of United Nations position 80. In mid-May, approximately 180 individuals fleeing from shelling and clashes in Jaseem, in the area of limitation, took shelter near United Nations position 80. At the time of writing the present report, all of them remained in the vicinity of the position, in addition to around 30 others, who had arrived in April. Also in mid-May, UNDOF observed around 180 persons who had fled fighting in Nawa, and had moved to Al Rafid village in the area of separation.

13. In the afternoon of 24 April, two members of the armed opposition displayed the severed head of a presumed Syrian armed forces officer as they passed United Nations position 80. Since the capture of Tal al-Garbi and Tal al-Sharqi, the armed members of the opposition have been observed to move almost freely between Al-Rafid and the Bir Ajam-Braika area. Bir Ajam serves as a training area and assembly point for armed opposition members. By the end of April, UNDOF and Observer Group Golan observed the flying of black flags believed to be associated with militant groups scattered throughout the central and southern part of the area of separation, including on three Syrian armed forces positions captured by the armed members of the opposition. The ongoing fighting significantly restricted the UNDOF supply routes to United Nations positions in the southern part of the area of operations.

14. On 8 May, several units of armed members of different opposition groups totalling an estimated 100 individuals supported by three tanks, approached the area of Al Qahtaniyah in the central area of separation to the east of Quneitra and attacked the village from the south and the east. Syrian armed forces personnel left their positions in the village, following which UNDOF observed them firing onto the village from their positions along the Bravo line and in the area of limitation. Clashes between armed members of the opposition and Syrian armed forces personnel based in Quneitra also ensued in the area of the main road junction north of United Nations position 60. In the course of the fighting, UNDOF observed approximately 120 additional armed members of the opposition join the fighting. Syrian armed forces were observed to have reinforced their troops in the area with six tanks, four armoured vehicles, and around 70 to 80 troops. Fighting subsided in the afternoon but recommenced the following day and continues at the time of writing this report, albeit at reduced levels and remains more localized in the immediate vicinity of Al Qahtaniyah and Quneitra, and generally does not affect movement on the main road. At the time of reporting, three Syrian Arab armed forces tanks remain in the area of separation. Two tanks in the possession of the armed opposition groups also are believed to remain in the area of separation. Between 10 and 14 May, UNDOF observed around 170 civilians leaving

Al Qahtaniyah towards the north. UNDOF stopped all movement in the area of separation during the first day of the fighting; operational movements recommenced in areas not affected the following day. Regular movement on the main road connecting Camp Faouar and Camp Ziouani recommenced on 13 May. The Senior Syrian Arab Delegate conveyed to UNDOF that Syria had no intention to attack IDF, but only to fight the armed opposition, and that any rounds landing west of the ceasefire line would be inadvertent. IDF informed the UNDOF Force Commander that Israel would not tolerate fire from the Bravo side landing on the Alpha side. During the initial phase of heavy fighting, the Force Commander remained in contact with both sides, urging them to exercise restraint, with a view to preventing an escalation of the situation between the two parties.

15. On numerous occasions during periods of fighting between the Syrian armed forces and armed members of the opposition, rounds landed inside or in close proximity to United Nations positions, at times forcing United Nations personnel to take shelter. On 4 April, personnel at United Nations observation post 53 observed a bullet hole in the window of a building at the position. On 17 April, one tank round and one air burst fired from a Syrian armed forces position in Kammuniyah, in the area of limitation, landed close to United Nations position 69. On 27 April and 2, 6 and 10 May, nine tank rounds fired from the same Syrian armed forces position landed in proximity to position 69, with one tank round hitting, on 6 May, the perimeter fence of the position. No injuries to United Nations personnel were sustained in the incidents. On 18 April, Syrian armed forces soldiers fired automatic gunfire at a civilian car travelling from Ruihinah to Bir Ajam passing by United Nations position 68. Subsequently, United Nations personnel at the position discovered a bullet mark on a sand bag. On 27 April, one burst of anti-aircraft fire from a Syrian armed forces position targeted one vehicle moving from Bir Ajam to Ruihinah. Two stray rounds impacted two buildings at United Nations position 68, resulting in minor damage to United Nations property. On 29 April, two stray bullets hit the wall of the generator building at the position and several rounds of anti-aircraft fire landed near the position. On 4 and 6 May, 6 and 11 bursts of anti-aircraft fire, respectively, from a Syrian armed forces position at Zbedah al-Sharkia in the area of limitation landed in proximity to United Nations position 68. On 22 April, one tank round and several bursts of anti-aircraft fire detonated in close proximity to United Nations observation post 52. On 23 April, one burst of fire impacted near United Nations observation post 52, when several bursts of anti-aircraft rounds were fired towards a vehicle passing on a road beneath the post. Several ricochets were heard over and within close proximity of the observation post during the engagement.

16. In the course of the fighting around Al Qahtaniyah and Quneitra, which started on 8 May, one mortar round hit United Nations position 60 and damaged five trucks. On the same day, several instances of firing close to the position occurred. United Nations personnel at positions 27 and 60 and personnel in Camp Ziouani went into the shelter during periods of heavy fighting in the area. United Nations position 27 in Quneitra sustained damage to a United Nations truck and a window in one of the position's buildings following an airburst in the vicinity of the old hospital building, which is used by the Syrian armed forces. Several armed members of the opposition moving onto a small hill in the vicinity of United Nations observation post 56 fired small arms and machine guns across the observation post towards a Syrian Arab armed forces position. A group of armed members of the opposition north of

observation post 51, on 8 May, fired approximately 20 single shots towards the lower platform of the observation post. During an inspection of Camp Ziouani premises on 12 May, three stray bullets were found to have impacted a supply store and one the windscreen of a United Nations vehicle. The Force Commander protested to the Senior Syrian Arab Delegate all firings into and close to United Nations positions and observation posts that were observed to have originated from Syrian armed forces positions.

17. In utilizing its best efforts to maintain the ceasefire and see that it is scrupulously observed, as prescribed by the Disengagement of Forces Agreement, UNDOF reports all breaches of the ceasefire line. The Force Commander maintained regular and close contact with IDF and the Senior Syrian Arab Delegate. During periods of heightened tensions and in the aftermath of incidents along the ceasefire line, the Force Commander was in immediate and ongoing contact with both parties to prevent an escalation of the situation across the ceasefire line.

18. The Syrian security forces continued to maintain checkpoints inside the area of separation mainly along the main road connecting Quneitra in the west to Khan Arnabah at the eastern entrance. With armed opposition groups dominant in significant parts of the area of separation, the Syrian armed forces withdrew from checkpoints in some areas and strengthened their deployment along and in areas close to the main road. In addition, Syrian armed forces personnel maintained checkpoints at the eastern entrances to the area of separation, straddling the Bravo line, to control and restrict traffic. The checkpoints often interfered with the freedom of movement of UNDOF and Observer Group Golan. Restrictions on the movement of UNDOF and Observer Group Golan in the areas of separation and limitation have increased as a result of extended clashes between the Syrian armed forces and armed members of the opposition, disrupting the supply lines to UNDOF positions in the southern part of the area of separation. The Senior Syrian Arab Delegate advised UNDOF that, for security reasons, all United Nations personnel should avoid areas where clashes were ongoing and that UNDOF should not carry out night-time movements.

19. During the reporting period, United Nations personnel encountered increased restrictions of movement and risk, owing also to the placement by armed members of the opposition of improvised explosive devices alongside roads in the area of separation. UNDOF continued to observe the presence of improvised explosive devices and roadblocks in the vicinity of or on access roads to United Nations positions 27, 60 and 68, United Nations observation posts 51 and 56, and outpost 32A.

20. On 20 March, an UNDOF convoy was stopped on two occasions by Syrian Arab armed forces at a checkpoint claiming that armed opposition groups were active in areas beyond the checkpoint. On the second occasion, a Syrian Arab armed forces soldier pointed a rifle at the lead vehicle for the convoy to stop and turn back. On 22 April, three unidentified armed persons attempted to stop an UNDOF convoy travelling from observation post 71 to Camp Faouar. The armed persons fired warning shots. The convoy did not stop and some stones were thrown towards one of the United Nations vehicles. Owing to the presence of armed opposition groups in the general area of Bayt Jinn and Mazra'at Bayt Jinn in the northern area of limitation, UNDOF continued to re-route its movements to Mount Hermon positions, resulting in a doubling of the travel time in each direction. On three

occasions, mortar fire landed in close proximity to an UNDOF convoy travelling between Camp Faouar and Damascus. No United Nations personnel were injured and no United Nations vehicles sustained damage in the incidents.

21. UNDOF has protested the presence of Syrian armed forces and equipment in the area of separation, the firing into and inside the area of separation and the firing towards United Nations personnel and facilities. The Force Commander reiterated to the Syrian authorities the obligation of the armed forces to halt military operations in the area of separation and to cease firing from the area of limitation, stressing the importance of abiding by the terms of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement and ensuring the safety and security of United Nations personnel on the ground. Senior United Nations officials have conveyed similar messages to the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations.

22. Within this challenging operational environment, UNDOF supervised the area of separation by manning static positions, conducting around-the-clock observation and resuming patrols along most of the ceasefire line to ensure no breaches of the ceasefire line occurred. UNDOF, through Observer Group Golan, continues to establish temporary observation posts in several locations along the ceasefire line on the Alpha side between two and four times weekly, so as to increase the Force's situational awareness of the area of separation, in particular in the south, where United Nations positions and observation posts have been vacated temporarily owing to the security situation. Through the Observer Group Golan, UNDOF continued to carry out fortnightly inspections of equipment and force levels in the area of limitation on the Alpha side. Liaison officers from the Alpha side accompanied Observer Group Golan inspection teams. Inspections and mobile operations in the area of limitation on the Bravo side remain suspended because of the security situation. As in the past, the Force faced restrictions on freedom of movement and its inspection teams were denied access to some positions on the Alpha side. Observer Group Golan members experienced a significant increase in restrictions of movement on the Alpha side when entering and exiting United Nations observation posts 52 and 73, located to the east of the Israeli technical fence. At the end of April, IDF unilaterally decided to decrease the number of technical fence crossings for the two observation posts from four to two per day, thereby hampering the ability of United Nations personnel to carry out vehicle patrols, as well as access by contractors to perform enhancement works at the observation posts.

23. UNDOF continued to adapt its operational posture to the military activities of the Syrian armed forces and armed members of the opposition in its area of operation. Following the incidents that occurred on 5 March (see S/2014/199, para. 5) and 18 March along the ceasefire line and on the basis of ongoing analysis of the security situation on the ground, UNDOF, in close liaison with the parties, recommenced its mobile operational activities along the ceasefire line. In the northern area of separation, UNDOF recommenced vehicle patrols from United Nations positions 27 to 37 and foot patrols from United Nations position 16 to observation post 73, a route that is inaccessible to vehicles. UNDOF also occupies again United Nations outpost 37B on a daily basis. In the southern part of the area of separation, UNDOF conducts daily patrols between United Nations positions 69, 80 and 85, as well as regular patrols to outposts 85A and 86B, with a view to observing developments in areas from which UNDOF temporarily withdrew its personnel in early 2013. UNDOF recommenced these patrols after having assessed

the prevailing security environment as permissive and not exposing United Nations peacekeepers to undue risk. The main effort continued to remain on static activities combined with a focus on enhanced situational analysis, reporting and liaising with the parties to prevent situations from escalating. At the end of April, UNDOF started repainting the United Nations barrels indicating the ceasefire line in the northern area of operations. Both parties maintained defensive positions in the respective areas of limitation. Israeli customs officials continued to operate periodically at the IDF post at the UNDOF crossing gate between the Israeli-occupied Golan and the Syrian Arab Republic.

24. In the vicinity of the ceasefire line in the area of separation, mines continued to pose a threat to UNDOF personnel and local inhabitants. Owing to the long-term presence of the mines and the deterioration of their detonation systems, the threat increases from year to year. On several occasions throughout the reporting period, United Nations personnel observed armed and unarmed persons digging out and removing landmines in the vicinity of the IDF technical fence and from around United Nations position 85. On 29 April, UNDOF observed 10 individuals collecting landmines south-west of Tal al-Sharqi when an explosion occurred, which resulted in the death of six individuals and the injury of four others. On 6 May, a landmine exploded approximately 600 metres from United Nations observation post 53, setting off a large grass fire, which in turn led to the explosion of additional mines. United Nations personnel evacuated briefly the observation post until the fire had subsided.

25. The limitations imposed by the security situation on the Bravo side notwithstanding, UNDOF continued its efforts to liaise with local authorities and engage with the local population to explain the mandate and activities of the Force. This remained important in the light of the security situation in the UNDOF area of operation and as part of the effort to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel on the ground.

26. On 20 May, UNDOF, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, facilitated the crossing of four students from the Bravo side to the Alpha side. UNDOF continued to provide emergency medical treatment to civilians on a strictly humanitarian basis. During periods of intensive fighting between the Syrian armed forces and armed members of the opposition, local inhabitants of areas under fire fled, moving to safer areas in the area of separation and limitation, at times seeking shelter in the vicinity of United Nations position 80. UNDOF observed hundreds of civilians leave their homes in Ruihinah, Um Batinah, Braika, Bir Ajam and adjacent communities.

27. As at 23 May, UNDOF comprised 1,251 troops, including 47 women, from Fiji (504), the Philippines (346), India (192), Ireland (135), Nepal (72) and the Netherlands (2). In addition, 77 military observers from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), including 4 women, assisted the Force in carrying out its tasks.

28. Given the evolving security situation in the UNDOF area of operation, UNDOF further adjusted its operations, with a view to ensuring its ability to implement its mandate safely and securely. The operational adjustments also involved a temporary shift in the focus of the activities of a number of Observer Group Golan military observers from patrolling and inspection to round-the-clock static observation, liaison and situation analysis. Essential operational and

administrative movements also are carried out. Restrictions placed by some Member States on the activities of UNTSO military observers on the Bravo side continue to limit their capacity in assisting the implementation of the mandate of UNDOF. These restrictions affect adversely the operational activities of Observer Group Golan, on whose skills UNDOF relies more heavily with the focus on static observation. UNDOF continues to adopt and update mitigation measures on the basis of a comprehensive risk assessment carried out by the Force with the support of the Secretariat. Measures introduced earlier remain in place, including the reinforcement by UNDOF soldiers of observation posts manned by Observer Group Golan military observers in specific locations, regular rehearsals of medical evacuation, shelter and other emergency exercises, improved perimeter defence of the Force headquarters and all other positions and provision of personal protective equipment to all military and civilian personnel and the necessary training. The UNDOF counter-improvised explosive device equipment arrived in Beirut and awaits the clearance of the Syrian authorities for entry into Syria. UNDOF continues to engage the Syrian authorities for an early induction into the mission of the counter-improvised explosive device equipment. This induction of the equipment in UNDOF will improve significantly the Force capability to counter improvised explosive devices. The overall security situation has rendered it necessary for UNDOF to continue to use, with the cooperation of the relevant authorities, alternative ports of entry and departure for Force personnel.

29. All movements of UNDOF personnel on the Bravo side continue to be carried out in formed convoys using armoured vehicles. Logistics movements are provided with armed escorts. Following the arrival of additional light armoured vehicles, all UNDOF national staff whose positions are based at UNDOF headquarters, Camp Faouar, regularly report to work. A number of national staff, whose functions do not require their presence in Camp Faouar, continue to work from the UNDOF office in Damascus. Only essential international staff work in Camp Faouar. The offices of non-essential staff have been relocated to Camp Ziouani, which also serves as an alternate headquarters of the Force.

III. Financial aspects

30. By its resolutions 67/278 of 28 June 2013 and 68/260 of 27 December 2013, the General Assembly appropriated the total amount of \$60.6 million for the maintenance of the Force for the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014. The proposed budget for UNDOF for the period from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015 is currently under consideration by the General Assembly during the second part of its resumed sixty-eighth session. Should the Security Council approve my recommendation set out in paragraph 44 below, the cost for the maintenance of the Force during the extension period will be limited to resources approved by the General Assembly.

31. As at 28 May 2014, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNDOF Special Account amounted to \$25.3 million. Total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at the same date amounted to \$1,229.0 million.

32. As at 27 May 2014, amounts owed to contributors for troop costs totalled \$2.9 million. Reimbursements for troop costs and for equipment and self-sustainment have been made for the period up to 31 January 2014 and

31 December 2013, respectively, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

IV. Implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973)

33. The Security Council, when deciding in its resolution 2131 (2013) to renew the mandate of UNDOF for a further period of six months, until 30 June 2014, called upon the parties concerned to immediately implement its resolution 338 (1973) and requested the Secretary-General to submit, at the end of the period, a report on developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement that resolution. The search for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, in particular the efforts made at various levels to implement resolution 338 (1973), was dealt with in my report on the situation in the Middle East (A/68/371), submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 67/24 on Jerusalem and 67/25 on the Syrian Golan.

34. Since the discontinuation of indirect peace talks in December 2008, there have been no negotiations between the parties. The Syrian conflict is further reducing the prospects for their resumption and progress towards peace between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. I look forward to a peaceful resolution of the crisis and the resumption of efforts towards a comprehensive, just and durable peace settlement, as called for by the Security Council in its resolution 338 (1973) and other relevant resolutions.

V. Observations

35. A stark reminder of the risk to the ceasefire was provided by the events of 18 and 19 March in which an explosion on the Alpha side injured Israel Defense Forces soldiers, and alarmingly, the Israel Defense Forces reacted with artillery and airstrikes against Syrian armed forces, resulting in the death and injury of Syrian military personnel. I would ask the Security Council to recall that UNDOF was established 40 years ago to maintain the ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and to see that it is scrupulously observed, and to supervise the Disengagement of Forces Agreement and its Protocol thereto with regard to the areas of separation and limitation, and that 40 years later the Golan is still occupied. There is a potent mix of factors now contributing to a volatile security situation that greatly risks undermining the Agreement. It remains critical that both sides work through UNDOF in case of incidents along or across the ceasefire line. The mandate of UNDOF remains an important element in ensuring the stability of the region.

36. I remain deeply concerned about the continuing deterioration of the security situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, its impact on the Syrian population and potential implications for the stability of the region. The situation has continued to affect significantly the UNDOF area of operation. The ongoing military activities in the area of separation continue to have the potential to heighten tensions between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and to jeopardize the ceasefire between the two countries, in addition to heightening the risk to United Nations personnel.

37. The at times severe and sustained engagements between the Syrian armed forces and armed members of the opposition in close proximity to United Nations personnel and positions are of great concern. The use of heavy weapons by both the

Syrian armed forces and armed members of the opposition in the continuing Syrian conflict, including air power by Government forces in the area of limitation on the Bravo side, remains disturbing.

38. I am gravely concerned by the dropping of bombs onto the area of separation by the Syrian armed forces aircraft on 23 and 24 April. There should be no military forces in the area of separation other than those of UNDOF, and I note with concern the use of Syrian armed forces and opposition tanks during clashes in the area of separation. I call upon all parties to the Syrian conflict to cease military actions throughout the country, including in the UNDOF area of operation. I call on the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to stop the use of airstrikes, which cause suffering to the civilian population. I also once again condemn the horrific atrocities committed by some armed members of the opposition and call upon all parties to the ongoing conflict to respect international humanitarian law. I reiterate that all military activities in the area of separation conducted by any actor pose a risk to the ceasefire and the local civilian population, in addition to United Nations personnel on the ground.

39. The presence of the Syrian armed forces and unauthorized military equipment in the area of separation, in addition to the firing from the Bravo side across the ceasefire line, are grave violations of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement. All incidents of firing into the area of separation and across the ceasefire line are also grave violations of the Agreement. I stress the importance of all parties' liaison with UNDOF in the first instance to prevent escalation of the situation. I call upon all parties to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and ensure respect for the safety and security of United Nations personnel, in addition to freedom of movement for the Force throughout its area of operation. For its part, the United Nations will spare no effort in ensuring that the long-held ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic continues to hold.

40. Any hostile act against United Nations personnel on the ground, including restricting their movement and threatening their physical safety, the direct and indirect firing at United Nations personnel and facilities by the Syrian armed forces or armed members of the opposition, and the use of United Nations premises, including United Nations positions vacated temporarily, by anyone other than United Nations personnel, is unacceptable. I remain deeply concerned by the numerous incidents involving United Nations personnel on the ground. I am also gravely concerned about United Nations positions caught in crossfire. The safety and security of UNDOF personnel and Observer Group Golan military observers, essential to enabling UNDOF to continue to implement its mandate, must be preserved.

41. The primary responsibility for the safety and security of United Nations personnel in the areas of separation and limitation on the Bravo side rests with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. I note the assistance provided by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic in facilitating the provision of essential supplies in support of the Force efforts to ensure that it continues implementing its mandate safely and securely. It is imperative that respect for the privileges and immunities of UNDOF and its freedom of movement be ensured. Armed members of the opposition operating in the UNDOF area of operation must be apprised of the mandate of the Force and immediately cease any actions that jeopardize the safety and security of United Nations personnel on the ground. The placing of improvised


explosive devices by armed members of the opposition, especially close to and on access routes to United Nations positions, is of particular concern. It exposes United Nations peacekeepers on the ground to further risk. It remains critical that countries with influence continue to strongly convey to the armed opposition groups in the UNDOF area of operation the need to halt all activities that endanger United Nations peacekeepers on the ground, including firing at peacekeepers, and to accord United Nations personnel the freedom to carry out their mandate safely and securely.

42. It is equally critical that the Security Council continue to bring its influence to bear on the parties concerned to ensure that UNDOF is accorded the ability to operate freely and securely within its area of operation and to carry out its important mandate. It is essential that UNDOF continue to have at its disposal all the means and resources that it needs to carry out its mandate safely and securely. It is vital that UNDOF retain the confidence and commitment of troop-contributing countries. I am grateful to the Governments of Fiji, India, Ireland, Nepal, the Netherlands and the Philippines for their contributions to UNDOF and for staying the course under challenging circumstances. In addition, I am grateful to the Member States contributing military observers to UNTSO. The continued credible presence of UNDOF remains an important element in ensuring stability on the Golan and in the region. I urge the countries that have restrictions on the activities of their military personnel on the Bravo side to consider lifting these restrictions.

43. Given the volatile security situation in its area of operation, the Force regularly reviews and adjusts as necessary its posture and operations and implements necessary mitigation measures. The process to enhance the self-defence capabilities of UNDOF, including increasing the strength of the Force to about 1,250 personnel and improving its self-defence equipment, within the parameters of the Protocol to the Disengagement of Forces Agreement, is ongoing. In addition, UNDOF continuously reviews and updates its contingency plans. The support of the parties and the Security Council is critical as UNDOF continues to adapt to the evolving situation.

44. Under the prevailing circumstances, I consider the continued presence of UNDOF in the area to be essential. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months, until 31 December 2014. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has given its assent to the proposed extension. The Government of Israel too has expressed its agreement.

45. In conclusion, I wish to express my appreciation to the Head of Mission and Force Commander, Lieutenant General Iqbal Singh Singha, and the military and civilian personnel serving under his leadership, who continue to perform with efficiency and commitment, under challenging circumstances, the important tasks assigned to them by the Security Council. I have full confidence that UNDOF will continue to use its best efforts to carry out its mandate. I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Governments contributing troops to UNDOF and to those providing UNTSO military observers assigned to the Force.





Security Council

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Letter dated 9 June 2014 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004), which was submitted to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011), in accordance with paragraph (a) of the annex to resolution 2082 (2012).

I should be grateful if the report could be brought to the attention of the Council members and issued as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Gary Quinlan
Chair

Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1988 (2011)



**Fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions
Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2082
(2012) concerning the Taliban and other associated
individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace,
stability and security of Afghanistan**

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Summary

A military stalemate continues in Afghanistan, but the highly successful first round of the elections in April 2014 confounded Taliban efforts to disrupt them. The Afghan National Security Forces are confident and have maintained control over towns and most districts, despite an unusually intensive Taliban campaign throughout the winter months. Continuing international economic support will be crucial following the transition of international forces out of Afghanistan, and States in the region remain concerned about the possible fallout from any instability.

Reconciliation has stalled although Afghan Government efforts to promote political contacts continue. The Taliban remain divided on the value of political engagement, and face a "resource curse" of income from narcotics and illegal mining that may reduce incentives for a lasting settlement. They are experiencing a range of divisions driven primarily by differences over political strategy, amplified by increasingly diversified revenue streams. It is of concern that some Taliban groups are expressing sympathy for Al-Qaida (QE.A.4.01) and its affiliates.

Al-Qaida affiliates including the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (QE.T.132.11), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (QE.L.118.05), Lashkar i Jhangvi (QE.L.96.03) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (QE.I.10.01) regularly participate in attacks on the Afghan forces. The presence of these groups poses a direct terrorist challenge for Afghanistan, South and Central Asia and the wider international community.

The sanctions regime established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1988 (2011) remains an important tool for Afghanistan and the international community. The Taliban continue to seek its removal. A sanctions focus on key facilitators is likely to yield the greatest operational impact. The Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team recommends steps to disrupt Taliban income from illegal mining, informal translations of the sanctions list into Dari and Pashto to improve national implementation, and intensified work with INTERPOL and other international organizations to improve implementation of the sanctions measures.

I. Evidence base

1. The Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team bases its assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan on its extensive interaction with the Government of Afghanistan and international forces stationed in the country. In addition to interaction at the national level, the Team also regularly meets with Afghan and international interlocutors at the provincial level. From January 2013 to April 2014, the Team made five visits to Afghanistan and visited 11 of its provinces.¹ In addition to Kabul, several of the provinces in the south and east of the country were visited multiple times.² The Team's assessment is also guided by discussions with relevant Member States, including those in Afghanistan's neighbourhood. Over the past 12 months the Team has met with Pakistani, Indian, Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen and Gulf officials in New York and during travel in Central Asia, South Asia and the Middle East. The Team has also participated in multilateral meetings involving intelligence and security services of relevant countries, including the annual counter-terrorism meeting hosted by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. The Team actively tracks relevant academic and policy literature on Afghanistan and meets with relevant scholars and specialists.

II. The political context

2. The situation in Afghanistan continues to be characterized by a military stalemate between the Afghan National Security Forces and the Afghan insurgency. Taliban forces remain unable to take control of district centres or towns — even in the absence of international military forces, and despite ever-increasing efforts.³ As of April 2014, the Taliban and associated groups have been unsuccessful⁴ in taking new terrain, although the threat posed by Taliban fighters remains active and direct. According to the Afghan security forces threat assessment of late November 2013,⁵ covering all 34 provinces, the threat level was as follows:

- Fifteen provinces have a moderate (normal or low) threat level
- Eight provinces have a raised threat level
- Eleven provinces have a high threat level

¹ Kabul, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Helmand, Herat, Balkh, Kunduz, Kunar, Nangarhar, Khost and Paktia.

² Kandahar (3 visits), Helmand (2 visits), Nangarhar (3 visits) and Khost (2 visits).

³ The Monitoring Team in its third report noted that the increased Taliban violence did not translate into gains on the ground (S/2013/656, para. 4). In the most recent report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan it was noted that 2013 was the year with the highest number of security incidents ever with the exception of 2011 (A/68/789-S/2014/163, para. 14).

⁴ The Taliban reacted negatively to media coverage of casualty figures contained in the Team's third report (S/2013/656). In a statement and one lengthy interview, the Taliban denied the Team's estimate of casualties they reportedly suffered through 2013, but refused to offer their own assessment of their losses and gains. In the interview they also confirmed that they do not hold cities in Afghanistan and alleged that they had made a deliberate decision not to attack population centres in the past fighting season (statement by Zabihullah Mujahid, "Each of the United Nations report goes through the American filter and is published on their demand", published on the official Taliban website on 27 November 2013).

⁵ Official threat assessment of the Afghan security forces of November 2013, made available to the Monitoring Team.

3. Broken down by districts, the picture looks more positive. Of all the 373 districts in Afghanistan, approximately 57 per cent experienced either no serious threat (132) or only occasional attacks (84), and were therefore considered to be exposed to a low to moderate threat level on election day. The number of districts exposed to raised (71) and high (82) threat levels amounted to approximately 41 per cent of all districts. Only four districts (one fewer than a year ago and 10 fewer than four years ago) are assessed to be currently under the control of the Taliban and their allies.⁶

4. This assessment and subsequent security arrangements were vindicated on election day, 5 April 2014, when the Taliban were unsuccessful in preventing not only the holding of the elections but also a massive turnout of voters.⁷ The turnout, according to estimates, is significantly higher than in the elections of 2009 and 2010.

5. The Afghan security forces maintain an aggressive posture, and are confident — provided they have continuing sufficient financial, training and logistical support — that they can maintain the status quo. Their operational capabilities currently allow for missions to outlying and remote areas of provinces.⁸ However, the capacity of the Afghan forces to hold these outlying areas over time has not yet developed.⁹ This hinders their ability to strike at one of the key funding sources for the Taliban,¹⁰ the illegal exploitation of natural resources in remote areas.¹¹

6. As the transition of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops out of Afghanistan concludes there are questions about what psychological impact the near or total absence of foreign troops, air assets and logistical capabilities will have on the Afghan forces. The evidence so far is reassuring. The Afghan forces have been conducting the bulk of their military operations without direct combat support from foreign troops and there is no reason to assume that they cannot continue to do so. However, morale within the forces depends on confidence about capabilities as much as the exercise of military operations. The impact of the transition will depend in part on the shape of the new government in Kabul and the confidence it instils, both within Afghanistan and in the broader region.

7. Some commentators continue to raise concerns about attrition within the Afghan forces, pointing to statistics on retention and desertion.¹² The Team, in its frequent interactions with Afghan security forces in the provinces, noted that there

⁶ These districts are Deshu in southern Helmand, Baghran in northern Helmand, Khak-e-Afghan in Zabul, and Nawa in Ghazni.

⁷ A total of 6,892,816 voters participated in the first round of the elections. See Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan, "Preliminary Results of 2014 Presidential Election", 26 April 2014, available from www.iec.org.af/media-section/press-releases/357-preliminary, accessed 30 April 2014.

⁸ For example, the extreme south and north of Helmand, or territory in Kunar Province east of the Kunar River.

⁹ Developing this capacity requires a long-term effort, which is unlikely to be achieved in the short term.

¹⁰ See section IX.B below, on the asset freeze.

¹¹ For example marble, precious stones, gemstones, timber.

¹² The United States Department of Defense noted an annual attrition for the Afghan National Army of 34 per cent. However the same report also notes that the total strength between September 2012 and September 2013 remained the same overall, between 180,000 and 185,000; see United States Department of Defense, "Report on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan", November 2013, available from www.defense.gov/pubs/October_1230_Report_Master_Nov7.pdf.

is a remarkable stability in the composition of Afghan force interlocutors. The Team has also observed that recruitment balances out losses, and training facilities are operating at their maximum capacity. The overall numbers in the Afghan national security forces therefore remain high, with over 193,000 army, 145,000 police and 27,000 local police personnel.¹³

8. Since November 2013 the Taliban have continued to conduct a high frequency of military attacks. This trend persisted throughout the winter season of 2013/14.¹⁴ At the beginning of the winter season, the senior Taliban leadership ordered commanders and fighters under its control to remain in Afghanistan and continue paramilitary operations.

9. The strategic goal of the Taliban appears to have been to deny Afghan Government forces time to regroup after a particularly violent summer campaign, and to prepare for large-scale disruption of the presidential and provincial council elections early in 2014.¹⁵ These orders were followed by a significant number of fighters. Consequently, the total number of attacks on Afghan force positions was not significantly lower during the winter months than in the summer months of 2013. The average size of the Taliban groups involved in these attacks decreased, however.¹⁶ Taliban fighters are reported to rely predominantly on local logistical support inside Afghanistan.

10. The Taliban achieved few strategic military successes in 2013. Despite their inability to make strategic gains, the Taliban retain the capability to conduct attacks in every part of Afghanistan. Their most widely publicized success was the takeover of Kiran-o Munjan district centre in southern Badakhshan on 29 September 2013, close to a lapis lazuli mine. This operation relied on insider support and foreign fighters who reportedly came from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region and entered Badakhshan through Nuristan. It took place in a district that had seen no previous combat and with a weak Afghan force presence. An Afghan relief force quickly scrambled from Kabul and Faizabad and retook control after less than 24 hours. This "dynamic occupation" Taliban tactic appeared designed mainly for propaganda rather than as a sustained display of military prowess.¹⁷ Similarly, the Taliban used two local infiltrators and foreign fighters in the overrunning of an Afghan Army outpost in Ghaziabad District of Kunar Province on 23 February

¹³ See A/68/789-S/2014/163, paras. 15-16.

¹⁴ Discussion with high-ranking Afghan security officials in Kabul in February 2014.

¹⁵ Discussion with Afghan security officials during the Monitoring Team visit to Afghanistan in February 2014.

¹⁶ Over the winter 2013-2014 the average Taliban group size was 30 to 50 fighters. While smaller than during the summer of 2013, this average group size was higher than in previous winters, when the average Taliban group encompassed 7 to 12 fighters (discussions of the Monitoring Team with Afghan officials in December 2013 and February 2014).

¹⁷ Details of the operation were provided to the Monitoring Team by senior Afghan army and police officials in December 2013 and February 2014. The Taliban released several statements and a video, called "The truthful", posted on its website on 24 February 2014. In the video the dead bodies of approximately one dozen Afghan police and army personnel are shown along with several vehicles captured by the Taliban. The aim of the video appears to be to promote two local Taliban leaders, Mawlawi Fasihuddin and Abdul Qadir Balkhi.

2014, killing 21 soldiers. Again, the Taliban could not hold the area and were reduced to exploiting the incident for propaganda.¹⁸

11. A complex suicide attack targeted the Lebanese restaurant La Taverna du Liban in Kabul on 17 February 2014. Twenty-one people were killed, including four United Nations staff members. The Taliban immediately claimed responsibility for the attack.¹⁹ The tone of Taliban propaganda in the aftermath of the attack demonstrates a growing emphasis on targeting humanitarian workers inside Afghanistan. On 1 March 2014 the Taliban posted on their official website an article acknowledging the fact that the attack killed the United Nations staff members and explaining their reasoning:

It is therefore hypocritical of these media outlets to [...] accuse the Islamic Emirate of breaching international law when its fighters target and kill foreigners that play a support role for the foreign invaders. The United Nations cannot claim to be exempt as from the beginning it has taken a partial role and supported the illegal invasion of Afghanistan.²⁰

12. The single greatest strategic failure for the Taliban was during the provincial council elections and first round of presidential elections on 5 April 2014. The logic of continuing Taliban activities during the winter of 2013/14 (when in past years there had been a lull in Taliban activities) was to prepare for a systematic campaign to disrupt the elections. During March 2014 there were a series of Taliban statements giving notice of their intent.²¹ There were also some serious high-profile attacks. On 20 March four underage Taliban fighters killed nine hotel guests, among them a popular Afghan journalist, in an attack on the prominent Serena Hotel in Kabul. On 23 March, Taliban fighters attacked the Afghan Independent Election Commission in Kabul. On 28 March a group of Taliban fighters, while attempting to

¹⁸ In a statement released on 3 March 2014, the Taliban claimed that the operation commander was Ghazi Mahmoud Helmandi, a former officer in the Afghan National Army who turned his gun on American soldiers in Ghaziabad on 11 May 2012, and subsequently fled and joined the Taliban. The Taliban claimed that Mahmoud was killed at the beginning of March 2014.

¹⁹ See "Kabul martyrdom attack was in retaliation for the massacre in Siyah Gerd", published on the official Taliban website on 18 January 2014.

²⁰ See "The Taverna attack: A red line double crossed?", published on the official Taliban website on 1 March 2014.

²¹ Mullah Mohammed Omar Ghulam Nabi (T.O.4.01) asked Afghans to boycott the election in his message on the occasion of Eid al-Adha on 13 October 2013. See "Message of felicitation of the esteemed Amir-ul-Momineen on the occasion of the Eid-ul-Odha", published on the official Taliban website on 24 October 2012. The Taliban website published multiple statements by the Taliban spokesperson against the participation of Afghans in the elections. On 10 March 2014, the Taliban advised the population to stay away from voting booths and rallies, to not put their lives in danger, and that anyone hurt on election day in the vicinity of the election sites would be responsible for their own injuries. See "Notification of Islamic Emirate regarding the upcoming elections", published on the official Taliban website on 10 March 2014.

On 2 April 2014, the Taliban claimed to have obtained a copy of the "security plan for the elections". The published document on the Taliban website contained only the names and other information about female police officers in charge of voter security in several provinces. On the same day, the Taliban issued a "final warning" on their website, declaring that "all parts of the elections are under the threat of attack by the mujahideen, and every polling station and every employee of the elections are in danger. A massive series of attacks will begin all over the country, ... the responsibility for whoever is harmed by participating in the bogus elections will be on his own shoulders"; see "The last statement of the Islamic Emirate about the project of bogus elections", published on the official Taliban website on 3 April 2014.

target a day-care centre of a faith-based international non-governmental organization in Kabul, mistakenly attacked a United States-based demining agency.²²

13. The April 2014 elections saw a high level of voter turnout in Afghanistan. This compares favourably to the 4.3 million voters who participated in the elections of 18 September 2010 for the Lower House of the National Assembly²³ and the 5.6 million voters who turned out for the last presidential elections on 20 August 2009.²⁴ Notwithstanding serious Taliban threats, nearly 7 million Afghans,²⁵ 58 per cent of eligible voters, took part in the election. This successful turnout was due to a series of factors including effective security planning by the Government of Afghanistan and popular mobilization in favour of participation. Some 350,000 Afghan security forces were deployed to secure the election. The number of Taliban attacks on the day of the election was significantly lower than during the last presidential election in 2009.²⁶ The fact that the presidential elections marked the end of the Karzai era, presenting Afghan voters with new choices for the future, may also have strengthened turnout. In any event, the high voter participation demonstrates the limited effectiveness of the Taliban intimidation strategy.

14. Notwithstanding this failure, Taliban propagandists tried to portray their operations on 5 April 2014 as a great success, claiming 1,088 attacks on election day, and that voter participation was under duress.²⁷ The evidence directly contradicts this. There were fewer than 300 Taliban-associated attacks on the day, demonstrating the Taliban's tenuous grasp of statistics. Voters meanwhile actively participated, notwithstanding the potential for and reports of some irregularities.²⁸

²² See for example Rod Nordland and Jawad Sukhanyar, "Attack at wrong door turns into fatal mistake for the Taliban, reports say", *New York Times*, 28 March 2014.

²³ A/65/612-S/2010/630, para. 4.

²⁴ Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan, "Press release of the Independent Election Commission with reference to announcement of preliminary results of 2009 presidential elections", 16 September 2009, available from www.iec.org.af/pdf/pressrelease/election_results_16%2009%202009.pdf, accessed 30 April 2014.

²⁵ See Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan, "Preliminary results of 2014 presidential election", 26 April 2014, available from www.iec.org.af/media-section/press-releases/357-preliminary, accessed 29 April 2014.

²⁶ In 2009 there were around 400 attacks on election day. See, for example, National Democratic Institute, "The 2009 presidential and provincial council elections in Afghanistan", 2010, available from www.ndi.org/files/Elections_in_Afghanistan_2009.pdf, accessed 29 April 2014. In 2014 international observers counted less than 300 attacks. See Joshua Partlow, "Violence data show spike during Afghan presidential election", *Washington Post*, 14 April 2014.

²⁷ In an official statement on their website the Taliban claimed that the population was forced to vote by armed personnel. In addition, the Taliban claimed to have carried out 1,088 attacks on election day. See "Rejoinder of the Islamic Emirate regarding the illusive and counterfeit election process", published on the official Taliban website on 7 April 2014.

²⁸ The Independent Electoral Complaints Commission of Afghanistan announced that it received over 70 complaints by presidential candidates concerning the preliminary results of the first round of the 2014 presidential elections. See Independent Electoral Complaints Commission of Afghanistan, "Sabt-i pesh az haftad shikayat nisbat ba natayij-i intikhabat-i riyasat-i jamhuri ta ba chasht-i roz-i dushanba" [Over 70 complaints concerning the preliminary results of the presidential election were received on Monday afternoon], 28 April 2014, available from www.iecc.org.af/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=58:70&Itemid=633, accessed 29 April 2014.

III. Reconciliation

15. The path to a sustainable political process with measurable results has been slow in Afghanistan. Efforts to open up channels to the Taliban have moved forward, however, and while a substantive settlement does not appear near there are opportunities for continuing dialogue. Once the second round of the presidential elections is concluded and the shape of the new Afghan Government is clear, there could be renewed opportunities for political talks. The primary impediment appears to be the lack of consensus on the Taliban side, where important parts of the Taliban leadership remain unpersuaded by the logic of negotiations and unconvinced that the current strength of the Afghan security forces will be maintained after transition. No significant gains can be made in view of these internal Taliban differences, although they do not rule out continuing contacts. As with all sensitive political processes in conflicts, reconciliation may or may not succeed — but it is unlikely to be expeditious.

16. Afghan Government and religious interlocutors have not been idle. One year after the High Peace Council presented its road map to peace, further steps towards a process have been taken. Since 2011 more than 30 individuals have been delisted from the list of individuals and entities established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011),²⁹ a number of whom were delisted on the basis of their reconciliation. Around 50 Taliban prisoners have been released by Pakistan and Afghanistan since 2012. The Taliban office in Doha has remained open. In a declaration adopted in September 2013, an international conference of religious scholars (ulama) condemned violence and extremism. It also called for continuing negotiations between the Government of Afghanistan and the Taliban without outside interference and encouraged regional States to support this process. That declaration developed a framework for potential negotiations.³⁰ These measures, combined with the direct contact of the Chairman of the High Peace Council with Abdul Ghani Baradar Abdul Ahmad Turk (T.I.B.24.01), also known as “Mullah Baradar” in Pakistan, and the support of the High Peace Council for an initiative of Abdul Wasay Mu'tasim Agha (formerly listed), emphasized the willingness of the Government of Afghanistan to enter into negotiations with the Taliban.

17. The Taliban, though, have not proved so forthcoming. Afghan as well as international officials and observers agree that key members of the Taliban leadership remain unpersuaded that the Afghan Government security forces will continue to perform well after 2014. These Taliban leaders are ready to sacrifice more Taliban fighters and other Afghans in the course of the coming year to maintain the current status quo. While one explanation of this may be political, that the senior Taliban leadership conclude that the Government of Afghanistan will become weaker and the Taliban position stronger, the other explanation rests with the political economy. The past year has been a bumper year for Taliban revenues,

²⁹ Hereinafter referred to as the “1988 Sanctions List”.

³⁰ Declaration of the International Ulama Conference on Islam and Peace, 24 September 2013, given to the Team by Afghan officials during its visit in September 2013.

boosted by booming narcotics income,³¹ revenue from corruption and extortion, and increasingly drawing on revenue from the illegal exploitation of natural resources. Parts of the Taliban are experiencing a "resource curse", for as Taliban finances have grown, the Taliban have become more of an economic actor, with incentives to preserve this income and less potential incentive to negotiate with the Government.

18. Not everyone associated with the Taliban is hostile to a political process. There are those within the movement who understand the logic and potential benefits of political engagement. The High Peace Council is currently supporting a political initiative led by Abdul Wasay Mu'tasim Agha. During the Taliban regime, Abdul Wasay Mu'tasim Agha served as Finance Minister. Beginning in 2010 he began to question senior military commanders of the Taliban on the wisdom of pursuing a solely military solution to the conflict. He survived an assassination attempt late in 2011, and received two travel ban exemptions from the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011), before being delisted on 19 July 2012. Since his delisting he has remained in close contact with the Afghan Government. In February 2014 Abdul Wasay Mu'tasim Agha came forward with a Declaration of the Islamic Movement of the Taliban in which he argued for a negotiated settlement between the Taliban³² and the Government of Afghanistan. His attempts to promote this agenda continue to meet with violent resistance from the Taliban leadership.

19. A first meeting of this new initiative was held on 12 February 2014 in the United Arab Emirates. The public declaration published as a result of the meeting makes the case for negotiations with the current Government of Afghanistan.³³ The meeting in the United Arab Emirates brought together several former Taliban leaders, and elicited expressions of support including from Abdul Raqib Takhari (TI.T.75.01),³⁴ who was assassinated in Peshawar, Pakistan, on 17 February. According to Afghan officials his assassins are believed to have been dispatched by the Taliban core leadership. His body was repatriated to Afghanistan by Pakistan through Torkham,³⁵ and flown to his home province by the Afghan National Army. President Karzai publicly called him a "martyr of the peace process".³⁶ Understandably, this has discouraged other listed members of the Taliban leadership potentially inclined towards a political process from openly declaring themselves in

³¹ According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, some 209,000 hectares were planted with opium in 2013, with an average yield of 26.3 kg per hectare. At average farm gate prices this would have resulted in revenue of approximately US\$ 950 million. See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013 Summary Findings*, available from www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghan_report_Summary_Findings_2013.pdf, accessed 29 April 2014.

If the poppy growing areas in Afghanistan are overlaid with the Afghan security forces threat assessment of November 2013, it becomes clear that opium is grown mostly in districts which have a raised or high threat level. It can be assumed that most of the profit derived from this high revenue benefited the Taliban in 2013.

³² No longer described as a parallel government or "Emirate", but as a "movement".

³³ Declaration by Abdul Wasay Mu'tasim Agha (formerly listed) of 12 February 2014, obtained by the Team.

³⁴ According to unconfirmed reports, Mr. Takhari had attended a preparatory meeting on 19 September 2013 in the United Arab Emirates, together with Mohammad Moslim Haqqani Muhammadi Gul (TI.H.73.01).

³⁵ Nangarhar Province.

³⁶ See, for example, Pajhwok Afghan News, "Takhari sacrificed his life for peace: Karzai", 18 February 2014, available from www.pajhwok.com/en/2014/02/18/takhari-sacrificed-his-life-peace-karzai, accessed 29 April 2014.

favour of it. On the website of the "Islamic Emirate" the Taliban have repudiated the actions of Abdul Wasay Mu'tasim Agha while alleging that Abdul Raqib Takhari was assassinated by the enemies of the Taliban.³⁷

IV. Status of the Taliban

20. The Taliban remain both united around a core ideology and divided by various factors, in particular policy, and, to a lesser extent, access to and use of revenue. At times these differences are articulated in terms of personality or tribal differences. While aspiring to become the government of Afghanistan, the Taliban show consensus on some issues (for example, the maintenance of attacks throughout the winter in preparation for their frustrated election disruption campaign) and cracks on others (the approach to political talks). The contrast between the cohesive command and control involved in sustaining the winter campaign, requiring Taliban fighters to follow senior leadership instructions, and the network division evident among plural Taliban "fronts" (*mahāz*) is striking. This network division is largely a product of the political economy of the Taliban, which remains understudied. Monitoring Team analysis suggests that these "fronts" developed in the field, and over time acquired sufficient direct control over funding to behave with increasing autonomy vis-à-vis the Taliban "central command".

21. The most visible sign of this phenomenon is the emergence of independent websites and social media outlets of these "new" organizations. As a result, the security situation is becoming more volatile. Examples of these new organizations are the "Da Fidayano Mahaz", the "Tora Bora Mahaz" and the "Al-Fath Jabha". Da Fidayano Mahaz originated within the Taliban of southern Afghanistan, and is headed by the brother of the former Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah Akhund. The Tora Bora Front is headed by the son of Yunus Khalis, whose father was the first to welcome and host Osama bin Laden (formerly listed) in Afghanistan. The last new organization, the Al-Fath Jabha is a "start-up" by a former acolyte of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (QI.H.88.03). In their propaganda, some of these start-ups post videos and articles in praise of Al-Qaida affiliates like Al-Qaida in Iraq (QE.J.115.04) and threaten attacks against countries perceived to be backing the Government of Afghanistan.

22. Internal conflicts may reflect changes in the Taliban finance structure.³⁸ According to the Afghan security forces and various media reports, over 50 Taliban mid-level operatives were assassinated throughout January and February 2014. Meanwhile ISAF base closures have led to the termination of supply contracts. Those killings may also therefore reflect a growing rivalry over diminishing resources, including the falling revenue from extortion linked to logistical and other economic activities of international forces inside Afghanistan.

23. Said Ahmed Shahidkhel (TI.S.28.01), shadow governor of Laghman Province, was shot at the end of 2013 but survived the attack. This was the second attempt on his life after an earlier attack in March 2012. He had been accused by other Taliban

³⁷ See "Sawanih-i mukhtasar-i mawlawi sahib Abdul Raqib shahid rahmehullah alayh" [Short overview of the life of the martyr Abdul Raqib Takhari, may God have mercy upon him], published on the official website of the Taliban on 23 February 2014.

³⁸ See S/2013/656, para. 44.

of personally profiting from funds extorted from trucking companies serving ISAF supply contracts on the Kandahar-Kabul ring road. In a similar vein, one of the important theological founding fathers of the Taliban ideology, Mawlawi Abdullah Zakeri, was assassinated on 30 January 2014 in Quetta, Pakistan. Although he had earlier signed numerous legal opinions endorsing attacks against the foreign presence, schools and the government in Afghanistan, he had also publically criticized those in the movement who profit from "the presence of the infidels".³⁹ Finally, according to Afghan security officials, a current conflict pits Mullah Ghazi, one of the co-founders of the Taliban movement, against the current Taliban leadership around Abdul Qayum Zakir, Akhtar Mohammad Mansour Shah Mohammed (TI.M.11.01) and Gul Agha Ishakzai (TI.I.147.10) over land rights in Maiwand District, a major opium-cultivating district to the west of Kandahar city.

24. While resource disputes get little attention from Taliban watchers, the internal Taliban conflict over the future strategy of the movement has been closely commented on.⁴⁰ According to high-ranking Afghan security officials, a number of alleged⁴¹ murders of Taliban in Quetta reflect political differences and revenge killings within Taliban factions. Nurullah Hotak was killed by unknown assailants in Quetta on 26 December 2013. Hotak was the Taliban shadow governor for Zabul and had — together with commander Abdul Malik — met with a delegation of the High Peace Council in December 2013. Abdul Malik was killed on 29 December 2013. An education adviser of the Taliban who worked with the Ministry of Education in Zabul Province was recently assassinated in Quetta. High-ranking Afghan officials believe that the victims were targeted because of their cooperation with the Government of Afghanistan.

V. Hekmatyar

25. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (QI.H.88.03) continues to oscillate between armed confrontation and political engagement. He instructed his followers to participate in the presidential and provincial council elections in April 2014 and vote for "his" candidate, Qutbuddin Helal. Qutbuddin Helal, who had nominated himself in September 2013 for the presidential elections, was publicly endorsed by Gulbuddin

³⁹ While an early advocate of the Taliban movement's general aims, he retired after a similar dispute with Mullah Mohammed Omar Ghulam Nabi (TI.O.4.01) early in 1995 to Pakistan, and returned only for a brief visit to Kandahar to successfully campaign against any attempts to extradite Osama bin Laden (formerly listed) in September and October 2001.

⁴⁰ See, for example, Abdul Ghani Kakar, "Afghan Taliban internal differences deepen. The killing of Maulana Abdullah Zakri confirms that differences exist among the militants, analysts say", 19 February 2014, available from http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/pakistan/main/2014/02/19/feature-01, accessed 29 April 2014.

⁴¹ The Team is aware through press reports that the Baluchistan Home Minister stated that he was not aware of these killings; see, for example, Zia Ur Rehman, "Who is killing Afghan Taliban in Pakistan?", *Friday Times*, 24 January 2014, available from www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/who-is-killing-afghan-taliban-in-pakistan/, accessed 29 April 2014.

Hekmatyar on 16 February 2014.⁴² On 28 February, in a response to criticism by the fundamentalist party Hezb al-Tahrir for participating in the elections, and for not obeying Mohammed Omar Ghulam Nabi (T.I.O.4.01), Gulbuddin Hekmatyar stated on his web page that Mohammed Omar Ghulam Nabi is a “fugitive and refugee”, while Hezb al-Tahrir is an “unknown group operating in Arab countries and receiving foreign countries’ directives and financial support”. At the same time Gulbuddin Hekmatyar vowed to continue “armed resistance” against foreign military supporters of the Government.⁴³

VI. Al-Qaida affiliates

26. One strategic challenge in Afghanistan after 2014 is the question of the presence and role of Al-Qaida affiliates. Afghan Government and neighbouring countries’ government officials have expressed their concern about the potential renewed activities of Al-Qaida and affiliates inside Afghanistan. According to the assessment of Afghan and international interlocutors of the Team, these Al-Qaida affiliated groups are unlikely to leave Afghanistan in the near future. They therefore present a worrying, long-term security threat emanating from Afghanistan into the region and beyond. This has particular ramifications for South and Central Asia, two regions that have both been directly affected by terrorist violence involving individuals and groups that have used Afghan territory for training or planning in the past.

27. Meanwhile groups related to Al-Qaida such as the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (QE.T.132.11), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (QE.L.118.05) and Lashkar i Jhangvi (QE.L.96.03) regularly participate in attacks on the Afghan security forces. Fighters from these groups are regularly encountered by the Afghan forces in eastern and — to a lesser extent — in southern Afghanistan. In northern Afghanistan, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (QE.I.10.01) continues to gather strength among local Afghans of Uzbek origin and continues to operate in several provinces. Afghan security forces in January 2014 twice reported the presence of Chechen fighters in the provinces of Logar and Kabul. Reporting by Afghan security forces also included activities of non-Afghan individuals loyal to Al-Qaida in Helmand Province in southern Afghanistan and in Kunar Province in eastern Afghanistan. It remains unclear which group was responsible for an attack on a border patrol force of Turkmenistan on 26 February 2014, in which three border guards were killed.⁴⁴ Primary information indicates a possible connection to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

⁴² See, for example, Tolonews, “Hezb-e-Islami endorses Helal in presidential election”, 16 February 2014, available from www.tolonews.com/en/election-2014/13874-hezb-e-islami-endorses-helal-in-presidential-election, accessed 29 April 2014; or Ghanizada, “Gulbuddin Hekmatyar supports Qotbuddin Hilal in presidential election”, 15 February 2014, available from www.khaama.com/gulbuddin-hekmatyar-supports-qotbuddin-hilal-in-presidential-election-2800, accessed 29 April 2014.

⁴³ See “Intikhabat aw da wulus omedwand”, 27 March 2014, available from www.dailyshahadat.com/sarmaqala-story.php?id=1389, accessed 29 April 2014.

⁴⁴ See, for example, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Afghan Taliban militants reportedly kill three Turkmen border guards”, 28 February 2014, available from www.rferl.org/content/turkmenistan-afghanistan-taliban-attack/25280134.html, accessed 29 April 2014.

VII. Sanctions List

28. The 1988 Sanctions List continues to have 132 individuals and 4 entities, with no change to the total number since the third report of the Team in 2013. However, one individual (Badrudin Haqqani) was delisted in 2013 following the official confirmation of his death, and one individual, Qari Saifullah Tokhi (TI.T.168.14) was listed in January 2014.⁴⁵ The Team has also suggested a range of amendments to the List, 41 of which were accepted by the Committee in December 2013. The Team has since suggested 25 further amendments, a number of which are still under consideration by the Committee.

29. The addition of Qari Saifullah Tokhi (TI.T.168.14) to the 1988 Sanctions List sends an important message about the role played by facilitators of the Afghan insurgency, in particular those involved in the supply of improvised explosive devices. Facilitators, whether they are part of the improvised explosive device supply chain or part of the Taliban finance structure, occupy crucial roles in the functioning of the insurgency as a whole. Disrupting the activities of these key individuals can hinder the effectiveness of the insurgency. The Monitoring Team believes that focusing on key facilitators in listings can be a very effective way of further targeting the sanctions regime established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011). Such listings directly address the network character of the insurgency, on which the Monitoring Team has written previously.⁴⁶

30. The annex to this report provides an overview of the composition of the top leadership of the Taliban. It is presented as an update of the list that the Monitoring Team presented in its first report, in 2012.⁴⁷ Each individual on this list represents the top level of various networks linked to them. The fact that only one member of the crucial Taliban finance commission, Gul Agha Ishakzai (TI.I.147.10), is listed on the 1988 Sanctions List suggests that the current composition of the List requires constant refreshing in order to tackle key Taliban-related finance networks.

31. Listings related to the financial structure of the Taliban have been successful in putting pressure on the insurgency. According to Afghan security officials, the two money changers Khairullah Barakzai Khudai Nazar (TI.K.163.12) and Abdul Satar Abdul Manan (TI.A.162.12)⁴⁸ have split up and attempted to individually restart business activities in Kandahar. Afghan officials estimate that the net worth of the assets of both Khairullah Barakzai Khudai Nazar and Abdul Satar Abdul Manan was significantly reduced as a result of their listing on the 1988 Sanctions List. However, both seem to have managed to sell about 500 residential plots of the Ayno Mena project in Kandahar in 2013 and thus partially refinanced themselves.⁴⁹ Afghan authorities detected and blocked plans by these individuals to open up new shops in the city.⁵⁰ According to high-ranking Afghan security officials, Malik Noorzai (TI.N.154.11) and his brother Faizullah Khan Noorzai (TI.M.153.11) have

⁴⁵ Security Council press release of 19 March 2014.

⁴⁶ S/2013/656, paras. 13-17.

⁴⁷ S/2012/683, annex.

⁴⁸ Co-owners of Haji Khairullah Haji Sattar Money Exchange (TE.H.10.12).

⁴⁹ According to discussions with relevant Afghan security officials in Kandahar in September 2013 and December 2014.

⁵⁰ After the Team's visit in September 2013, Khairullah Barakzai Khudai Nazar (TI.K.163.12) tried to open a new office in Lemar Market. This was stopped by Afghan authorities.

managed to restart their business operations through a new company headed by their sons in Afghanistan in 2013.

32. These developments are not surprising. Targeted sanctions can retain their effectiveness only if they take into account the fact that sanctioned individuals and entities react and try to avert the pressure levied upon them by global sanctions measures. This is specifically the case for individuals and entities involved in financing the Afghan insurgency. Therefore, it will remain a central part of the work of the Monitoring Team, in close cooperation with the Committee, the Government of Afghanistan and other Member States to augment the information contained in the respective list entries, in particular list entries of financial facilitators and entities. A nimble, detail-focused sanctions regime can outpace inventive and evasive Taliban financiers.

VIII. Maintenance of the List

33. The quality and precision of the information in existing list entries has continued to improve since the third report of the Team. The most compelling development is the (slow) improvement in physical identifying information, including photographs or other biometric information where possible. This is not always an easy process given that biometric information may be highly classified if drawn from intelligence sources or subject to data privacy protection in various national jurisdictions. However, from a zero base in 2012 the Team has now gained a selection of photographs and/or physical descriptions from cooperating Member States, and hopes to build on this over the next 12 months.

34. A physical description and/or a picture greatly enhance the implementation of sanctions measures against the individual concerned while reducing the risk of false matches during identity checks. The Monitoring Team, supporting the Committee, and coordinating with the Government of Afghanistan, Member States and international organizations, will continue its efforts to obtain the respective data for listed individuals. Currently, eight entries in the 1988 Sanctions List lack sufficient identifiers for effective implementation.⁵¹ All eight cases relate to the nationality of the listed individuals.⁵²

35. Sanctions implementation inside Afghanistan depends on the availability of list information in local languages. While dedicated staff in the Afghan National Security Council, the Central Bank and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regularly translate and disseminate the information through official channels, a United Nations-led dissemination of the List in the national languages of Afghanistan (Pashto and Dari) would greatly improve timely implementation at the provincial level in the country. Afghan counterparts have repeatedly raised this topic with the Team during its visits to Afghanistan. The availability of the list entry data and the narrative summaries in local languages would also improve the understanding of the sanctions by the listed individuals and entities, who mostly do not speak any of the

⁵¹ See Security Council resolution 2082 (2012), para. 28 (b).

⁵² This represents an increase by two cases since the Team's third report (S/2013/656). These two cases were added when it was discovered that two listed individuals had fraudulently obtained identity documents of a Member State neighbouring Afghanistan.

official languages of the United Nations, as well as the public in Afghanistan and the Dari and Pashto speaking communities in the wider region.

36. **The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee request the Secretariat to explore cost-effective ways to make unofficial versions of the list entry data and the narrative summaries in Dari and Pashto available on the Committee's website by January 2015.**

IX. Implementation of sanctions

A. Travel ban

37. The Team continues to actively track individuals on the 1988 Sanctions List. The Monitoring Team has received no official confirmation from Member States of any alleged travel ban violations of those listed by the sanctions regime established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011).

38. Most Member States with direct transit links to Afghanistan currently employ some form of biometric entry controls at their borders. The increased inclusion of biometric data such as pictures and/or physical descriptions of listed individuals in their list entries and their respective INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices would strengthen the implementation of the travel ban. For a number of listed individuals there is information on the 1988 Sanctions List that they are or have been in detention or were arrested in the past. It is therefore likely that relevant Member States hold partial or complete sets of biometric data (among them pictures, fingerprints or iris scans) on those individuals.

39. Following the agreement of the Committee, the Team currently supports the Committee with the compilation of the data required to support a letter to relevant Member States requesting them to submit these datasets to INTERPOL for inclusion in the INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices, in accordance with their national legislation.

1. International Civil Aviation Organization

40. Air travel remains a crucial mode of transport for prominent listed individuals, in particular financiers. Airlines of the 191 States members of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) carried approximately 3 billion passengers in 2012, a number forecast to increase significantly.⁵³ Denying air travel offers a significant opportunity to influence the behaviour of listed individuals and disrupt their activities in support of the Taliban. Since the issuance of its third report the Team has continued to intensify its cooperation with ICAO. This cooperation currently offers two concrete opportunities to strengthen the implementation of the travel ban.

41. The first is the ICAO Point of Contact network, which connects all security officials of the civil aviation authorities that are members of ICAO. The Monitoring Team in consultation with ICAO and in close cooperation with the Committee has suggested transmitting the information contained in the list of entries of the

⁵³ See International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), "Forecasts of scheduled passenger traffic: medium-term passenger traffic forecasts — world air transport in 2012", available from www.icao.int/sustainability/pages/eap_fp_forecastmed.aspx, accessed 29 April 2014.

individuals on the 1988 and Al-Qaida sanctions lists. This would make the relevant identifying data available to all civil aviation authorities and raise their awareness of the existence of the travel ban and the identity of all listed individuals.

42. Building on the decision of 2006 of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999),⁵⁴ the Team is currently supporting the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) and the Secretariat in formulating an official proposal to ICAO.

43. Systems which handle passenger data prior to departure present a second opportunity to strengthen the implementation of the travel ban. Currently, two main systems exist in this regard, namely, the Passenger Name Record⁵⁵ and the Advance Passenger Information/Interactive Advance Passenger Information System.⁵⁶ These systems are slowly being introduced by member States to increase the security of international air travel and to prevent individuals on national no-fly lists from using this mode of transport. ICAO, in cooperation with the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA), has developed guidelines for member States which plan to implement these systems. In addition, in June 2012 WCO published a recommendation on the use of the Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record systems by Governments.

44. Currently, none of the ICAO/IATA/WCO guidelines or the WCO recommendation on the use of the Advance Passenger Information and the Passenger Name Record mentions Security Council sanctions. The text of the guidelines can be amended by the ICAO/IATA/WCO Contact Committee, which drafts and develops the guidelines. The Contact Committee is organized and chaired by WCO. Highlighting the use of the Passenger Name Record and Advance Passenger Information/Interactive Advance Passenger Information systems for the implementation of the travel ban would enhance the awareness of the respective national authorities of the sanctions regime.

45. Following a decision of the Committee in this regard, the Monitoring Team is currently supporting the Committee and the Secretariat in formulating an official proposal to WCO.

⁵⁴ See S/2006/635 (Committee position paper on the recommendations contained in the fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team), para. 13.

⁵⁵ The Passenger Name Record is a dataset created for each passenger at the time an airline ticket is booked. It can include a whole range of data on the passenger and his/her intended journey. Of interest for the sanctions regime are the following elements: name of the passenger, passport details (nationality, document number, and date of expiry), date and place of birth, payment/billing information (which includes a billing address). These elements could be checked against the identifying information in the 1988 Sanctions List. See also WCO/IATA/ICAO API Contact Committee, "Passenger and airport data interchange standards: Edifact implementation guide — PNR data pushed to States or other authorities. PNRGOV message", version 12.1, p. 6ff, available from www.icao.int/Security/FAL/Documents/PNRGOV-ImpGuide_12-1.pdf, accessed 29 April 2014.

⁵⁶ See also S/2013/656, para. 35. The Advance Passenger Information (API) and Interactive Advance Passenger Information (iAPI) are two similar systems that deal with passenger data relating to the group of individuals on each departing aircraft. API data are compiled by the airline and sent to the receiving country only once the aircraft has taken off. The country then checks this passenger list against its national watch lists while the aircraft is en route. iAPI is a more advanced version of API. iAPI automatically checks during the check-in process the passenger names against the no-fly lists of the country to which the passenger intends to travel and tells the airline in advance if the passenger in question is barred from entering the country.

2. Exemptions

46. No travel ban exemption requests have been submitted to the Committee under resolution 2082 (2012). One exemption has been granted since the Committee established the new procedures allowing a prompt response to exemption requests.

B. Asset freeze

1. Taliban revenue generation

47. The Taliban and affiliated groups generate revenue from a variety of sources inside Afghanistan. In addition to voluntary or forced donations from Afghan businesses outside the country as well as voluntary donations motivated by religious or ideological convictions, the Taliban have established a fairly sophisticated system to generate resources inside the country. Increasingly Taliban finances also rely on abductions of wealthy businessmen for ransom.⁵⁷ Executions of civilians and aid workers serve to assert their power and to deny the delivery of security and economic development. This exploits the strengths of the Taliban network and creates new funding channels. However, these activities increasingly change the character of parts of the movement from a group based on religiously couched ideology to a coalition of increasingly criminalized networks, guided by the profit motive. The Monitoring Team will continue to track this change in more detail over the next 12 months.

48. Unsurprisingly, Taliban revenue generation in Afghanistan is uneven and varies from province to province. In some provinces, such as Nimroz and Kandahar, the Taliban are able to sustain themselves by their own "economic" activities and consequently are not dependent on payments from the central leadership. Overall, Afghan security officials estimate that the Taliban extract about US\$ 7 million-\$8 million per month from Kandahar Province⁵⁸ through various schemes (drugs, extortion, illegal exploitation of minerals). This sum is sufficient to sustain Taliban activities in the province. In other provinces, such as Uruzgan or Zabul, the insurgency is dependent on financial support from the central leadership of the movement.

2. Case study of Helmand

49. Helmand is the single most important revenue-generating province for the Taliban in Afghanistan. It can therefore serve as an informative case study. The structure of Taliban revenue generation in Helmand incorporates all three major Taliban finance streams in the country: narcotics, extortion from the local economy and illegal exploitation of natural resources.

⁵⁷ According to Monitoring Team discussions with relevant Afghan officials and international experts on the issue.

⁵⁸ Information received by the Team in Kandahar during its visit in February 2014.

Taliban revenue from narcotics in Helmand

50. Helmand is the foremost opium-producing province in Afghanistan, with about 100,000 hectares planted with poppy in 2013.⁵⁹ The centre of poppy cultivation lies in Marjah District, south-west of the provincial capital Lashkargah. According to Afghan officials in Helmand, most of the poppy-cultivated land of 2013 is vulnerable to Taliban intimidation and its farmers can be expected to pay 10 per cent of opium production as "tax". Early indications are that even more land is being cultivated with poppy in 2014 than in 2013. Therefore, a significant increase in Taliban revenue from the poppy harvest should be expected. In the worst case scenario, Afghan officials in Helmand estimate a \$50 million yield from poppy cultivation in the May 2014 harvest.⁶⁰ Drug smugglers provide the farmers with fertilizers and an advance payment of around 50 per cent of the value of the expected harvest. If farmers cannot provide the necessary amount of opium by harvest time, they become indebted to the drug smugglers.

Taliban revenue from illegal exploitation of natural resources

51. Marble mining is a major factor contributing to the provincial economy in Helmand. The annual worldwide production of marble measures over 100 million tons. This generates a total revenue of around \$40 billion per annum.⁶¹ Afghan reserves are valued at a total of 9 billion tons, worth between \$150 billion and \$200 billion. From 2008 to 2012, the official Afghan marble industry grew considerably, and is currently estimated to extract from 124,000 to 155,000 tons per annum. This generates around \$15 million in annual revenue.⁶²

52. The Government of Afghanistan has licensed five mining companies in Helmand Province. These mine onyx marble, a variant of the marble family used for decorative purposes, and generate a total state revenue of Af 17 million (approximately \$300,000). The Government raises around Af 3,500 (approximately \$60) per ton of onyx marble extracted. Onyx marble in Helmand is mined only in opencast mining operations. The stone can be found from 2 to 5 m below the surface, eliminating the need for tunnelling. In extracting onyx marble in Helmand, licensed mining companies use stone-cutting machinery in order to preserve the quality of the stone. Consequently, none of the legally registered mining companies in Helmand has a licence to purchase or handle explosive materials.

⁵⁹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013 Summary Findings*, p. 6; available from www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghan_report_Summary_Findings_2013.pdf, accessed 29 April 2014.

⁶⁰ With an average yield of 25 kg per hectare, and average farm-gate prices of US\$ 140 per kg the "tax" amounts to about \$350 per hectare. Afghan security officials explained to the Team that the Taliban would on average realize around \$254 per hectare because the yield may be lower or harvests underreported. This means that the expected primary revenue from the opium yield in 2014 lies somewhere between \$15 million (assuming taxation of 60,000 hectares — 60 per cent of the total area cultivated in 2013 with poppy) and \$35.9 million (revenue generated in 2013). If the harvest is extraordinary, this could rise to \$50.26 million (assuming a repeat of the 40 per cent revenue growth realized in 2013).

⁶¹ Melissa Skorka, "Afghanistan's untold success story", *Foreign Policy*, 22 October 2013, available from http://southasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/22/afghanistans_untold_success_story, accessed 30 April 2014.

⁶² Abdul Ghafar Rassin, "A comprehensive study of marble industry in Afghanistan" (Afghanistan Investment Support Agency, Kabul, April 2012).

53. Owing to the widespread availability of marble in the southern districts of the province, in which the Taliban are able to control the countryside outside the population centres, illegal mining in Helmand forms a second major finance stream for the Taliban. The illegal and unlicensed mining sector in the province appears to be several times larger than the legal mining sector. The Team has currently identified from 25 to 30 illegal mining operations in southern Helmand.⁶³ Most of these illegal mining operations are close to the border with Pakistan (Deshu District), enabling the illegal miners to quickly and easily smuggle the illegally mined stone out of Afghanistan and on to the international market, accompanied by forged documents identifying the onyx marble as having been mined in a neighbouring country.

54. Although it is difficult to ascertain the total revenue generated by illegal mining in the province, the sheer number of illegal mining sites in the south of the province indicates that this revenue stream is significant. The Monitoring Team will continue to research the issue. The Team's preliminary assessment is that this Taliban revenue stream is significantly larger than \$10 million a year. In contrast with legal mining, illegal miners use explosives to quickly extract the onyx marble. This negatively affects the quality of the stone. However, as the illegally mined onyx marble is not taxed, the profit margin for illegally mined onyx marble remains high, even if it is of inferior quality.

55. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee agree on a list of relevant Member States to which a letter can be written including a background paper highlighting the role of illegally mined onyx marble for the financing of the Taliban. This letter could also encourage Member States to highlight this issue to importers of onyx marble in their country and encourage those that have not yet done so to apply appropriate know-your-customer principles.

Taliban revenue from extortion in Helmand

56. Construction companies are the primary target of Taliban extortion activities in the non-agricultural sector in Helmand. Humanitarian actors are currently — by and large — not targeted by the Taliban. The Taliban also extort money from some rural populations where state-provided electricity is under Taliban control.

Use of revenue from Helmand

57. The Taliban "financial commission" in Helmand transfers the proceeds of the Taliban economic activities in the province to the Quetta Shura. The transfer of these proceeds is done mainly through drugs. The drugs are smuggled out of the province and sold in Pakistan. This cash is then transferred either in currency or through *hawaladars* to the Quetta Shura. The Taliban spend approximately 20 per cent of their total proceeds in Helmand on the fight against the Government; 80 per cent of their proceeds are transferred to the Quetta Shura. The Quetta Shura then redistributes the money to provinces in which the Taliban are not able to cover their expenses by local economic activities, such as Zabul and Uruzgan.

⁶³ The Team has engaged provincial security and mining officials in Helmand and combined data gathered from those meetings with data gleaned from the United States Geological Survey of Afghanistan and commercially available satellite imagery of southern Helmand.

3. Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Afghanistan

58. Senior Afghan finance officials point out that, owing to a persistent trust deficit in Afghanistan's banking sector, about 90 per cent of all transactions in Afghanistan continue to be undertaken via money service providers (*hawaladars*). The Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Afghanistan (FinTRACA) is the central Afghan stakeholder in this regard. It has continued to make progress in registering *hawaladars* in Afghanistan, requiring regular reporting from registered financial enterprises. As of April 2014 FinTRACA has registered over 1,000 money service providers⁶⁴ and plans to increase the penalties for unregistered providers. At the beginning of the registration process for money service providers in Afghanistan, penalties were kept deliberately low (about \$300) in order to draw money service providers into the FinTRACA-led registration process and to prevent them going underground with their operations. With growing registration even in insecure areas such as Khost and Helmand, FinTRACA feels that a more aggressive approach can now have a positive effect.

59. Numerous challenges remain for FinTRACA, primarily in the area of capacity-building, personnel retention, international cooperation and information exchange. Detailed requirements are identified by FinTRACA, which is also in touch with the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The Monitoring Team continues to promote the value of FinTRACA with partners in other States and international organizations. The Team is in close contact with FinTRACA and receives regular updates on the implementation of the asset freeze in Afghanistan.⁶⁵

C. Arms embargo

60. The 2013 fighting season saw the partial return of the Taliban to standard infantry tactics. This reflects the Taliban attempt to move from non-conventional into subconventional warfare, albeit executed without much success so far. Nevertheless, Taliban reliance on improvised explosive devices as a main weapon of choice has not changed since the issuance of the third report of the Team. The number of such devices employed by the Taliban in any given time period continues to grow. The Monitoring Team tracks and documents the use of industrially produced components by the Afghan insurgency.

61. The Monitoring Team is currently discussing various potential proposals to counter this threat in cooperation with the Government of Afghanistan and other international stakeholders, in support of the work of the Committee.

62. Based on the national threat assessment of 2011, and the national security strategy of 2012, the National Security Council has identified the threat posed by improvised explosive devices, both through the use of home-made explosives made from dual-use precursors and through the use of industrially produced explosives. Afghanistan is addressing these risk areas through the national counter-improvised explosive device strategy, which was signed by President Hamid Karzai in October

⁶⁴ A marked increase compared to the beginning of 2013, when around 800 money service providers were registered with FinTRACA.

⁶⁵ The latest update was received by the Monitoring Team during its visit to Afghanistan in February 2014.

2013.⁶⁶ Counter-improvised explosive device capabilities have found an institutional home in the Afghan National Army with the creation of dedicated structures. During the past five years a multi-agency Afghan counter-improvised explosive device working group has met on an irregular basis. This has now been transformed into a permanent institution in Kabul. The influx of industrial components used in improvised explosive devices is continuing. The Government has identified the mining sector as a particular risk area.⁶⁷ This has led to representatives of the Ministry of Mines becoming part of the Afghan multi-agency counter-improvised explosive device working group.

63. Since the end of 2013, the Taliban acquired more sophisticated improvised explosive devices. For example, in January 2014, Afghan security authorities in Kandahar seized a particularly sophisticated suicide vest camouflaged as a leather jacket.⁶⁸ The analysis of this jacket revealed that it would have been practically undetectable with metal detectors. In contrast to other suicide vests, the explosive material was woven into the threads of the padding of the jacket, making it also unrecognizable as a suicide vest during a physical body search. This particular specimen demonstrates the high grade of sophistication that Taliban makers of improvised explosive devices are currently capable of employing for attacks on high-value targets inside Afghanistan.

64. In addition to the growing technical sophistication, the Taliban are also capable of constructing extremely large improvised explosive devices. The Ministry of Defence reported on one recently constructed vehicle-borne improvised explosive device that was loaded with a total of 35 tons of explosives in the Paktia-Khost region.⁶⁹ For these large devices, the Taliban and affiliated groups acquire precursors for home-made explosives and industrially produced components outside the country. After the materials are brought into the country, the large improvised explosive device is assembled just before its intended use.

65. A final discernable trend is a marked shift from victim-operated improvised explosive devices (pressure plates) to remotely detonated devices (command wire, telephones, radios, etc.) in the south of the country.⁷⁰ This represents a departure from the low-tech devices (pressure plates) that were common in the south at the beginning of 2013. The primary base for home-made explosives is now potassium chlorate, mostly imported from outside Afghanistan.

⁶⁶ The full text of the strategy was given to the Team during its visit to Afghanistan in December 2013.

⁶⁷ See also S/2013/656, paras. 55-65.

⁶⁸ Afghan security officials in Kandahar forwarded an analysis of the jacket to the Team during its visit in January 2014.

⁶⁹ Information from the National Security Council of Afghanistan, January 2014.

⁷⁰ See also United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), "Annual report 2013: Protection of civilians in armed conflict", Kabul, February 2014, pp. 18-21, available from <http://info.publicintelligence.net/UNAMA-CivilianDeaths2013.pdf>, accessed 29 April 2014.

X. Work of the Monitoring Team

A. Analysis, monitoring and implementation

66. Since the issuance of the third report of the Monitoring Team, the Team has continued to focus on its core business, namely, analysing the threat posed by the Taliban and their affiliates to peace, stability and security in Afghanistan, providing advice on listings, and focusing on strengthening the impact of the sanctions regime. The Monitoring Team's advantage lies in its ability to work collaboratively with Governments around the world, in particular the Government of Afghanistan. In addition, the Team reaches out to external specialists in order to make an integrated assessment of the threat posed by the Taliban and associates and to advance a targeted, effective and fair sanctions regime. The Team's own expertise on Afghanistan, together with that of specialists on finance, arms and border security measures, helps to sustain these efforts.

B. Cooperation with Member States

67. The Monitoring Team has continued to reach out to Member States as requested by the Security Council in its resolution 2082 (2012). Since the issuance of the third report the Team has made two extended visits to Afghanistan, where it held discussions on the overall political and security situation, as well as on listed individuals and entities, with national and international authorities in Kabul and with provincial officials in Helmand, Kandahar and Nangarhar. These visits helped the Team to strengthen its cooperation with key stakeholders of the Afghan political security structure, especially the High Peace Council and the National Security Council and its focal point for sanctions, as they play an active and crucial role in the implementation of the sanctions regime inside Afghanistan.

68. In addition, the Monitoring Team liaised closely with relevant Member States through their representatives in Afghanistan and in their respective capitals. Those visits helped the Team to understand the challenges that Member States face in implementing the sanctions regime. The Team has also attached great importance, during its direct engagement with national authorities, to the request made by the Security Council in paragraph 36 of resolution 2082 (2012) that the Team should facilitate assistance on capacity-building upon request by Member States, and will continue to further develop this approach.

C. Cooperation with other United Nations bodies

69. The Monitoring Team works closely with other United Nations expert groups, special political missions and United Nations agencies. The Team participated in a UNICEF global meeting on humanitarian action in complex and high-threat environments in Jordan. The Team cooperates on a daily basis with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

D. International and regional organizations

70. The Monitoring Team cooperates closely with a range of regional and international organizations. During its visits to Afghanistan, the Monitoring Team interacted regularly with specialist forces of ISAF and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Team also attended a meeting of experts on money-laundering and terrorist financing typologies organized by the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force in Doha, and an expert meeting on countering terrorist financing of the "Heart of Asia" group of countries in Kabul.

E. Cooperation between the Security Council and the International Criminal Police Organization

71. The Team has continued to strengthen its active cooperation with INTERPOL and the INTERPOL National Central Bureau in Afghanistan. The Team has consistently received positive feedback from Member State officials during its country visits and regional meetings about the impact of the Special Notices on the implementation of the sanctions. In coordination with the Secretariat, the Team currently works with relevant Member States to connect Red Notices, issued by those Member States for individuals on the 1988 Sanctions List, to the Special Notices issued in the framework of the sanctions regime established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011).

72. Following its recommendation in the third report, agreed to by the Committee, the Monitoring Team has developed a draft Orange Notice in the context of the sanctions regime. In cooperation with the Secretariat and the Committee, the Team is currently exploring the technical feasibility of introducing this Orange Notice into the INTERPOL system.

73. INTERPOL maintains a range of relevant databases, access to which would significantly enhance the work of the Committee as well as the Monitoring Team. In particular the Lost and Stolen Travel Documents, the Travel Documents Associated with Notices and the I-Arms databases would be important pools of information for the work of the Committee and the Team.

74. **The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee, following consultations with the Secretariat and the Monitoring Team, approach INTERPOL for Secretariat access to these databases.**

F. Building links with academic and civil society experts

75. The Monitoring Team is mandated to study and report on the changing nature of the threat posed by the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, including through dialogue with relevant scholars and academic bodies. Since October 2013, the Team has taken part in three major international conferences. One was held in Oman, and focused in part on the future regional environment after 2014. Another in Australia focused on the outlook for Afghanistan after the presidential elections and the withdrawal of ISAF in 2014. A third conference in Denmark focused on the current status and future outlook of the Taliban movement. In addition, the Team has held around 20 meetings with external experts and scholars. Members of the Team

have also given talks at the United Nations Association in New York, the University of Austin in Texas, and the University of Oxford.

G. Contributing to the public debate

76. The Team would welcome feedback on the analysis and suggestions contained in the present report, which can be sent to 1988mt@un.org.

Annex

Overview of the current Taliban central leadership

1. This overview was compiled on the basis of information obtained from and corroborated by various official Afghan interlocutors of the Monitoring Team from the Afghan National Army, branches and various offices in the National Police, and the National Directorate of Security during the recent visit of the Monitoring Team.
2. This updates the list contained in the Monitoring Team's first comprehensive report of 2012 (S/2012/683). Names marked with an asterisk (*) denote individuals that were not in the same position when the list of S/2012/683 was compiled in 2011.

Leadership

Amir ul-Mu'minin Mohamed Omar Ghulam Nabi (TI.O.4.01)

Leadership Council

Chairman and Senior Adviser	Akhtar Mohammad Mansour Shah Mohammed (TLM.11.01) ^a
Leadership Council member	Abdul Qayum Zakir from Helmand ^b
Leadership Council member	Hafiz Majid
Leadership Council member	Mohammad Abbas Akhund (TI.A.66.01)*
Leadership Council member	Mohammad Hasan Rahmani (TI.R.96.01)
Leadership Council member	Mohammad Hassan Akhund ("Babar") (TI.H.2.01)
Leadership Council member	Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani (TI.H.144.07)
Leadership Council member	Abdul Razaq Akhund Lala Akhund (TI.A.53.01)
Leadership Council member	Torak Agha from Kandahar ^c
Leadership Council member	Gul Agha Ishakzai (TI.I.147.10)
Leadership Council member	Shaikh Abdul Hakim from Kandahar*
Leadership Council member	Amir Khan Motaqi (TI.M.26.01)*
Leadership Council member	Abdul Kabir Mohammad Jan (TI.A.3.01)*
Leadership Council member	Mawlawi Sharafuddin from Helmand*
Leadership Council member	Abdul Samad Sani from Kandahar*

^a Akhtar Mohammad is described by some sources as the "second deputy Amir" (*dweyim na'ib amir*) as he took over a lot of the duties previously exercised by Abdul Ghani Baradar Abdul Ahmad Turk (TI.B.24.01), following the arrest of the latter in February 2010 in Pakistan.

^b Abdul Qayum Zakir, son of Mullah Saifullah, approximately 41 years old, born in Kajaki District, Helmand Province.

^c Torak Agha, son of Mawlawi Nazar Mohammad, approximately 50 years old, born in Maiwand District, Kandahar Province, belongs to the Alizai tribe.

Military Commission

Chairman	Abdul Qayum Zakir from Helmand ^d
Member	Sayyid Ala'uddin Agha from Panjway District in Kandahar*
Member	Ahmad Zia Agha (Tl.A.156.12)*
Member	Mohammad Naim Barich Khudaidad (Tl.N.13.01)*
Member	Amir Khan Haqqani from Zabul*
Member	Mawlawi Sharif from Jawzjan*. ^e
Member	Mullah Meshr Akhund from Helmand*
Member	Mullah Najibullah from Ghazni*

External and Internal Relations Commission (formerly Political Commission)

Chairman	Sayyid Tayyib Agha from Kandahar*
Member	Mohammadullah Mati (Tl.M.68.01), known as "Mullah Nanai"*
Member	Abdul Habib Alizai (Tl.A.148.10), known as "Bismillah Agha"*
Member	Mullah Abdul Bari from Uruzgan*
Member	Mullah Abdul Aziz from Uruzgan*
Member	Amir Khan Motaqi (Tl.M.26.01)*
Member	Din Mohammad Hanif (Tl.H.43.01)*
Member	Jan Mohammad Madani Ikram (Tl.M.119.01)*
Member	Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai Padshah Khan (Tl.S.67.01)*
Member	Mawlawi Nik (Nek) Mohammad*
Member	Mohammad Sohail Shaheen (formerly listed)*
Member	Jan Mohamad Ahmadzai (Mohammad Zahed Ahmadzai)*

^d He reportedly resigned from this function for health reasons in April 2014. See "Clarification regarding the resignation of Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir, the head of Military Commission of Islamic Emirate", published on the official Taliban website on 26 April 2014, accessed 29 April 2014.

^e Mawlawi Sharif, also known as Sharafuddin Sharafat son of Abdul Ahad, approximately 45 years old, born in Khwaja Doku District, Jawzjan Province.

Cultural Commission^f

Chairman	Amir Khan Motaqi (TI.M.26.01)
Member	Abdul Jalil Haqqani Wali Mohammad (TI.A.34.01)*
Member	Mawlawi Abdul Hadi from Kandahar*
Member	Mawlawi Sharafuddin from Helmand*

Financial Commission

Chairman	Gul Agha Ishakzai (TI.I.147.10)
Member	Mawlawi Qaher from Uruzgan*
Member	Dr. Amin from Uruzgan*
Member	Abdul Samad Sani from Kandahar*
Member	Mullah Zarif from Helmand*

Non-Governmental Organization and Contractors' Commission

Chairman	Bilal Ahmad Zadran from Paktia* ^g
Member	Qudratullah Jamal (TI.J.47.01)*

Recruitment Commission

Member	Mohammad Hasan Rahmani (TI.R.96.01)*
Member	Abdul Razaq Akhund Lala Akhund (TI.A.53.01)*
Member	Mullah Baz Muhammad from Farah*
Member	Mohammad Essa Akhund from Kandahar (TI.A.60.01)*
Member	Manzur from Kandahar*

Judicial Commission

Chairman	Shaikh Mawlawi Abdul Hakim from Helmand*
Member	Abdul Qayum from Kandahar*
Member	Mawlawi Abdul Ghafur Mufti from Kandahar*
Member	Noor Mohammad Saqib (TI.S.110.01)*

^f Also known as the Media Commission or the Spokesperson's Office using the aliases Hakimullah Mujahid, Qari Yusuf Ahmad Ahmadi from Helmand and Zabihullah Mujahid from Nangarhar.

^g Late in September 2013 Bilal Ahmad Zadran was appointed as the "officer in charge" of the Haqqani network's finance department, taking over from Nasiruddin Haqqani (TI.H.146.10).

Health Commission

Chairman	Mohammad Abbas Akhund (TI.A.66.01)
Member	Mawlawi Ishaq Akhundzada from Ghazni*
Member	Hajji Sharafuddin from Band-e Temur District in Kandahar*
Member	Mawlawi Allah Nazar from Arghandab District in Kandahar*
Member	Dr. Akhundzada from Uruzgan*
Member	Abdul Bari from Kandahar*

Intelligence Commission

Chairman	Mullah Abdul Ghani a.k.a. Amer Ghani from Nimroz*
Member	Amir Khan Motaqi (TI.M.26.01)*

Prisoners Commission

Member	Walijan (TI.W.95.01)
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Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali**I. Introduction**

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2100 (2013), by which the Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and requested me to periodically update it on the situation in Mali and the implementation of the Mission's mandate. The present report covers the period from 24 March 2014 to 26 May 2014.

II. Political process

2. Efforts to advance the political process during the reporting period were seriously disrupted when armed clashes between the Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF) and the Mouvement national pour la libération de l'Azawad (MNLA) together with associated armed groups took place in Kidal between 16 and 21 May. The resumption of hostilities between the Malian authorities, and armed groups — all signatories to the Ouagadougou preliminary agreement of 18 June 2013 — called into serious question the measures taken to date to bring about inclusive talks. At the same time, the origins and aftermath of the recent fighting point to the implementation of the preliminary agreement as the necessary path out of the crisis. The ceasefire agreement reached on 23 May between the parties through the mediation of Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, President of Mauritania and Chair of the African Union, and my Special Representative commits the parties to return to the preliminary agreement and an immediate resumption of negotiations with the support of the international partners.

3. The armed confrontation in Kidal broke out as Prime Minister Moussa Mara was visiting the city. Prior to the Prime Minister's visit, my Special Representative and other international partners had cautioned the Government that the success of such a visit would necessitate thorough political and security preparation. At the Government's request, MINUSMA supported the visit by airlifting Malian gendarmes to Kidal and reinforcing the presence of MINUSMA formed police units and military units. The Mission coordinated security preparations with the Malian authorities and the French forces of Operation Serval. Demonstrations against the planned visit started in Kidal on the eve of the Prime Minister's arrival. On the morning of 17 May, sporadic shots were fired between elements of MDSF and MNLA in the vicinity of the Governorate of Kidal. The Prime Minister visited the



MDSF camp and proceeded to the Governorate, where the security situation deteriorated further. The Governorate was set on fire and MNLA and the Haut conseil pour l'unité de l'Azawad (HCUA) took MDSF elements and Government authorities prisoner. The Prime Minister returned to the MDSF camp in Kidal, with support from MINUSMA uniformed personnel, and was transported by MINUSMA helicopter to Gao on the morning of 18 May. A Government statement issued on the evening of 17 May described the events in Kidal as "a declaration of war" and promised that "the appropriate response will follow". The Government condemned the killing of eight civilians at the Governorate, including six civil servants, and called for an international commission of inquiry to establish the facts. For its part, MNLA issued statements claiming that MDSF troops had provoked the fighting and that the group was acting in self-defence.

4. During the night of 17 to 18 May, MINUSMA and Operation Serval mediated a ceasefire between the two parties. However, both sides proceeded to mobilize reinforcements and on 21 May, MDSF launched an assault on Kidal using heavy weapons. The armed groups repulsed the Government troops, which took heavy casualties and retreated. As at 26 May, MDSF had withdrawn from Kidal and several other north-eastern towns. MNLA assumed control of the MDSF camp in Kidal and seized large quantities of abandoned MDSF equipment. MINUSMA evacuated and provided medical care to wounded MDSF personnel and civilians and worked with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to arrange the release of prisoners. MDSF soldiers sought refuge at MINUSMA bases in Kidal and other cities in the north.

5. The casualty toll following these confrontations remains uncertain, but MINUSMA was able to confirm 41 persons killed, including 8 civilians, 6 of whom were civil servants, and 33 members of MDSF.

6. The international community immediately condemned the violence. The various démarches and statements demonstrated the international consensus regarding support for the full restoration of State authority and sovereignty over the entire territory of Mali. At the same time, all international actors emphasized the need for an immediate cessation of hostilities and a return to the political process. Through the intervention of the Chair of the African Union with the support of my Special Representative, a formal ceasefire agreement was reached between the parties on 23 May.

7. Major political developments prior to the events in Kidal included the resignation on 5 April of Prime Minister Oumar Tatam Ly. In his resignation letter, published in the media, Mr. Ly pointed to what he characterized as deficiencies in the work of the Government that inhibited his ability to address the core challenges facing the country and fast-track reforms urgently needed to improve government performance. The President of Mali, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, immediately appointed Moussa Mara, a former presidential candidate and member of the minority Yelema party, as Prime Minister.

8. On 11 April, Prime Minister Mara formed a Government of 31 ministers, 5 of whom are women and 23 of whom are members of the political party of the President, the Rassemblement pour le Mali. A number of ministers maintained their previous positions, including the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Interior and Security. Zahabi Ould Sidi Mohamed, Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation under the previous Government, was named Minister of National

Reconciliation and Abdoulaye Diop was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, African Integration and International Cooperation.

9. On 29 April, Prime Minister Mara delivered his inaugural address to the National Assembly and presented his Government's plan of action for 2013-2018. On 2 May, members of Parliament adopted the action plan following a parliamentary debate. Prime Minister Mara identified the revival of the peace process, national reconciliation and the status of opposition parties as priority issues. He announced the Government's intention to reflect on territorial reorganization.

Dialogue and reconciliation

10. On 22 April, President Keita appointed former Prime Minister Modibo Keita as his High Representative for Inter-Malian Inclusive Dialogue, with responsibility for overseeing the peace talks between the Government and the armed movements based on a road map that would need to be developed and agreed by all parties. Since his appointment, High Representative Keita has consulted with national and international actors on the peace process. During the reporting period, no significant progress, however, was achieved on establishing a draft road map for an inclusive dialogue, as had been planned during the informal workshops held in February and March with the facilitation of MINUSMA and the involvement of the Government, local authorities, civil society and armed groups.

11. From 29 April to 2 May, MNLA held its congress in Kidal. In its final communiqué, it expressed concern about the slow pace of implementation of the preliminary agreement but reiterated its commitment to the agreement, reaffirming its readiness to participate in political dialogue under the auspices of the international community. The group also stated its willingness to collaborate with other movements and organizations. The HCUA congress, held in Kidal on 12 and 13 May to review options for the resolution of the crisis, endorsed a final communiqué in which it reaffirmed its attachment to the preliminary agreement and called upon the Government to initiate a dialogue without preconditions. HCUA also expressed confidence in the international community regarding the choice of a mediator and a neutral ground for the dialogue.

12. On 24 April, ministers from Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger met in Algeria to discuss regional stability and security, including the full implementation of the preliminary agreement. During the meeting, the Malian authorities stressed the need to create, without delay, the conditions to begin dialogue among Malians and reiterated their request to the Government of Algeria to continue to play a key role in that respect. The final communiqué of the meeting welcomed and supported Algeria's initiative aimed at creating coherence among and between the armed groups prior to negotiations with the Government. Participants also agreed to continue their efforts to pave the way to inclusive talks.

13. Following the Parliament's adoption on 20 March of a bill establishing the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, the Ministry of National Reconciliation committed to appoint the future commissioners through a procedure that will ensure geographical and ethnic representation. However, the Commission has not yet been formed and concrete proposals regarding the selection procedure have yet to be put forward.

III. Security and stabilization

A. Security situation

14. The events described in paragraphs 2 to 5 above compounded an already deteriorated security situation in Mali. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Kidal, the continuing influence of groups such as Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and the Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'ouest had resulted in a substantial increase in asymmetric attacks targeting the Malian security forces, MINUSMA and Operation Serval. The Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu regions experienced improvised explosive device attacks and indirect rocket fire targeting Operation Serval, Malian and MINUSMA personnel and contingents. Six rocket attacks and 11 improvised explosive device attacks were recorded during the reporting period. Seven MDSF were wounded in the attacks, while one Operation Serval soldier was killed and three others were injured in attacks on 12 April and 7 May. Seven MINUSMA peacekeepers were injured during separate incidents on 30 March, 23 April and 13 May.

15. Threats of retaliation against civilians for cooperating with the international community were reported during the reporting period, along with targeted assassinations of alleged MDSF informants. On 8 and 9 April, alleged Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb fighters distributed leaflets in Arabic to the Zouera and Dhouya populations in the Timbuktu region, warning them of the consequences of cooperating with "France and its allies". On 20 April, suspected Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb elements reportedly attacked a position held by MNLA in the Talhandak area, Kidal region. On 2 May, a 60-year-old man was shot in Kidal town, reportedly because of his alleged cooperation with Operation Serval and Malian forces. Supporters of rival armed groups in northern Mali, and especially MNLA members, were subject to similar hostile acts.

16. On 22 April, the Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'ouest announced the death of the French hostage Gilberto Rodriguez Leal, who had been abducted in November 2012, without specifying the circumstances of his death. On 17 April, four ICRC staff members and a fifth aid worker, whom the Mouvement claimed to have kidnapped on 8 February, were released during an Operation Serval operation in the Timbuktu region. The threat of kidnapping remains significant, especially in the northern regions and along the Mauritanian border.

17. Terrorist and armed groups continue to circulate and operate in the north, with an increasing footprint in the mountainous area north of Kidal, the Adrar des Ifoghas, posing a significant threat to civilians, mandate implementation and humanitarian operations by threatening MINUSMA and humanitarian personnel and hampering movements. On 30 March, a MINUSMA logistics convoy hit an improvised explosive device on the road connecting Ansongo and Menaka in the Gao region. On 7 April, an improvised explosive device exploded in Menaka in the vicinity of the MINUSMA camp. The device was remote-controlled, demonstrating the insurgents' improved tactics and underscoring the vulnerability of United Nations and humanitarian personnel.

18. On 23 April, a landmine explosion in the vicinity of the Kidal airstrip seriously injured a MINUSMA peacekeeper and damaged his vehicle. United Nations aircraft temporarily suspended flights to Kidal, seriously hindering direct support and

access. On 30 April, a remote-controlled device was found 300 metres outside the MINUSMA camp in Kidal. Improvised explosive device attacks also resulted in civilian casualties. Two civilians were killed on 3 May when an improvised explosive device destroyed their vehicle near Aguelhok. Rockets did not cause casualties during the reporting period but have landed in and near MINUSMA and civilian locations, including an empty school compound south of Gao town on 8 May and in the centre of Gao town on 14 April.

19. MINUSMA received reliable reports of armed clashes between and within armed groups during the reporting period. Elements of the Mouvement arabe de l'Azawad clashed on 29 and 30 April in an area located between Léré and Lerneb, near the Mauritanian border, reportedly killing at least three members of the Mouvement. Clashes also reportedly took place between elements of Mouvement arabe de l'Azawad and MNLA east of Bourem in the Gao region.

20. Banditry and harassment by armed groups and unidentified gunmen, including, reportedly, self-defence militias, remain a serious concern in northern Mali and in the larger Niger Delta region. Recurrent break-ins in Kidal town led local businessmen to organize a vigilante group of 12 unarmed guards to secure the market. Road banditry also affected MINUSMA, in particular in the Kidal region. On 21 April, armed individuals attacked a MINUSMA-contracted truck on the Anefis-Kidal road and on 22 April, armed individuals attacked trucks transporting provisions for MINUSMA 50 kilometres south of Tessalit, stealing goods, food and water without causing injury or damage.

B. Mine action

21. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) continued to survey, clear and mark priority contaminated areas in central and northern Mali in order to minimize explosive hazards for returnees and conflict-affected communities. As at May 2014, 843 villages had been surveyed. Eighty-three dangerous areas have been identified and 1,250 items of unexploded ordnance and 45,270 items of small arms ammunition have been destroyed. Risk education was also provided to 17 humanitarian workers working in contaminated areas. UNMAS continued to deliver explosive awareness training to MINUSMA military, police and civilians, including explosive ordnance disposal units, and to MDSF personnel. In response to a request from the Malian Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior and Security, UNMAS is disposing of a stockpile of 60 tons of obsolete and expired ammunition, including 85 surface-to-air missiles, at risk of accidental explosion.

C. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

22. On 14 March, the Government and armed groups, with the exception of MNLA, agreed on ways to implement the operational modalities for cantonment established on 18 February 2014. As a first step, all participating armed groups designated representatives for the site reconnaissance teams and the operations coordination cell. On 3 April, the site reconnaissance teams began the process of identifying priority cantonment sites in the Kidal and Gao regions. In addition to the Aghareous Keyone site (42 kilometres outside of Kidal), where construction under the \$3 million Peacebuilding Fund project has started, 8 of the 15 additional

potential sites proposed by armed groups have been surveyed based on legal, logistic and security considerations. A report will be submitted to the Mixed Technical Commission on Security for final validation of sites once the identification process is completed. However, owing to the resumption of fighting between MNLA-led armed groups and MDSF, food deliveries to the pre-cantonment sites were suspended pending a decision by the Mixed Technical Commission on Security to resume. Following the recent fighting in Kidal, where the MNLA and HCUA fighters included those participating in pre-cantonment and receiving food assistance from MINUSMA, the Mission intends to proceed with the construction of the additional cantonment sites after the parties have renewed their commitment to cantonment, including a technical plan. MINUSMA continues to engage with the Government on the next steps for the cantonment process, the establishment of a national commission for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and the development of a comprehensive national programme before inclusive talks begin.

IV. Re-establishment of State authority

23. Prior to the resumption of hostilities in the north, a total of 161 prefects and sub-prefects had returned to the Gao, Kidal, Mopti and Timbuktu regions. In Mopti, 99 per cent of State officials have been redeployed; in Gao and Timbuktu, the level is 50 per cent; in Kidal, until recent events, redeployment was estimated at 20 per cent. Few officials, gendarmes or police officers have taken up posts outside the principal towns owing to lack of security, infrastructure and resources and the slow pace of socioeconomic activities. Six members of the corps préfectoral were killed in the recent incidents in Kidal and reports have been received that representatives of the administration have left their posts in the north.

A. Security sector reform

24. During the reporting period, the Government, with support from the United Nations and key partners, made progress in framing a national security sector reform vision, setting up a coordination mechanism and assessing fundraising opportunities through the security sector reform multidisciplinary working group established earlier in 2014. Proposals for the reform process framework and for the coordination mechanism are being reviewed by the Government with the objective of organizing two restitution workshops for national authorities and civil society and a national convention on security sector reform in the coming months.

25. Meanwhile, international partners, including the European Union Training Mission in Mali, key bilateral actors and MINUSMA, are discussing ways to strengthen the coordination of international efforts in support of security sector reform. MINUSMA has consulted with the Parliament and main civil society organizations on issues pertaining to the strengthening of national ownership of security sector reform and democratic oversight of security institutions.

26. Coordination mechanisms with national and international stakeholders on small arms and light weapons control and border strengthening have been initiated at the request of the Malian Ministry of Interior and Security. Along with MINUSMA, the Malian border police and gendarmerie conducted a border security

assessment in Labbezanga, on the border with the Niger, and in Léré, on the Mauritanian border, from 27 to 29 April 2014.

B. Law enforcement, justice and corrections institutions

27. Prior to the recent developments in the north, the redeployment of judicial authorities and the rehabilitation of judicial and prison facilities in the north continued. The tribunals in Bourem, Gao, Gourma-Rarhous, Niafunké and Timbuktu and the prisons in Douentza, Gao, Gourma-Rarhous, Timbuktu and Youwarou were operational; however, the impact of recent hostilities remains to be assessed.

28. The reopening of additional courts and prisons, as well as the operations of those already open, remain impaired by insecurity and the lack of adequate infrastructure, inadequately trained personnel and insufficient financial and administrative capacities. While fundraising for a \$17 million project proposal is under way, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and MINUSMA have begun several activities to rehabilitate the Timbuktu court, the Niafunké court, préfecture and sous-préfecture and the Kidal préfecture and sous-préfecture. On 7 May, the Ministry of Justice, UNDP and the Netherlands signed an agreement to rehabilitate 11 courts and judges' residences. The Mission supported the operationalization of courts in the north through training, advice and quick-impact projects. Prior to the recent developments in Kidal, MNLA control of justice and corrections institutions hindered the reopening of the Justice of Peace Tribunal and the prison.

29. Before 16 May, a total of 2,026 gendarmes and police officers were deployed in the north, compared with 469 before the crisis in 2012, reflecting the Malian authorities' policy to transfer law and order responsibilities from the armed forces to law enforcement institutions. Twenty-two MINUSMA police trained 897 police officers and gendarmes during the reporting period. The Mission also provided human rights training and is cooperating with the gendarmerie to include human rights training in its curriculum. Ninety additional officers from the national police and gendarmerie were deployed to reinforce security around the Prime Minister's visit to Kidal.

V. Human rights protection

A. Human rights

30. Following the recent developments, a human rights special investigation team was dispatched to Kidal on 23 May to investigate recent human rights violations linked to the fighting between Government forces and armed groups. On 24 May, the team was provided with access to the 13 detainees held by MNLA and the 32 detainees held by HCUA since 21 May, following the clashes in Kidal with the Malian armed forces. No cases of ill treatment were reported.

31. The human rights situation in Mali remained fragile as MINUSMA continued to document human rights violations and abuses by MDSF and armed groups in the northern regions. On 16 April in Gao, a Tuareg cattle herder was shot and killed by MDSF while grazing his cattle. One soldier has been arrested by Malian authorities

and an investigation is ongoing. In Mopti, a man from the Dogon ethnic group was arrested during the night of 11 to 12 April and died as a result of ill treatment by the Malian police. The Malian authorities have not yet opened an investigation into the case.

32. Progress has been made in the prosecution of the members of the former junta. Twenty-one senior members of the military and security apparatus have been charged and detained and are awaiting trial in relation to the disappearance and summary execution of 25 soldiers following the counter-coup of April 2012. On 22 April, General Amadou Haya Sanago and his lawyers appeared before a judge on charges of complicity in kidnapping. Following interrogation, the charge was amended to complicity in kidnapping and murder. However, less prominent cases have not progressed.

B. Protection of civilians

33. Civilians have not been specifically targeted by the ongoing armed clashes in the northern areas. However, these clashes and the general insecurity in the north have a significant impact on people's freedom of movement, constrain regular economic opportunities and result, in some cases, in civilian casualties.

34. MINUSMA continues to develop an integrated strategy on the protection of civilians. This strategy is aimed at formalizing responses in close coordination with United Nations agencies, based on comprehensive risk and vulnerability analyses throughout the northern regions. As a result, joint protection teams will be established at the field level, along with coordination mechanisms to link all protection actors of the Mission and the protection cluster.

35. Inter- and intra-ethnic tensions and violence in the northern regions continued. As part of early warning and response, during the reporting period, MINUSMA conducted 14 protection assessment missions in at-risk areas prone to inter-communal violence.

C. Child protection

36. Since my previous report (S/2014/229), no new cases of children detained for alleged association with armed groups have been recorded. Seven children remain in detention in Bamako, while two have been released. The Mission continues to advocate with the Malian authorities for their release.

37. The Mission is seeking the rehabilitation and integration of two boys reportedly associated with armed groups who were arrested by Operation Serval during a military operation in April and handed over to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and ICRC, while nine children in the UNICEF-led transit and care centre are awaiting reunification with their families.

D. Conflict-related sexual violence

38. Community volunteers and focal points in Mopti and Bamako report that victims of sexual- and gender-based violence continue to come forward for services.

However, no free medical or psychosocial support services are available for these victims among the displaced populations in Bamako or Mopti. Services available in the regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu are extremely limited. There is an urgent need for medical, psychosocial and legal assistance.

VI. Early recovery and development

39. MINUSMA and the United Nations country team have expanded recovery programming for the northern regions to support recovery and stabilization activities. Efforts continue to finalize quick-impact projects in close cooperation with national and international organizations and cover areas such as the rehabilitation of administrative buildings, support to local cooperatives and improved access to water for populations.

40. In addition to the \$3 million project on cantonment in Kidal, on 2 April I approved Mali's request for eligibility for financing through the Peacebuilding Fund. This frees up an additional \$7 million for MINUSMA and the agencies, funds and programmes to support peace consolidation activities in four key areas: national dialogue and reconciliation, security and justice, restoration of State authority and inclusive governance, and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees. A major development in creating an enabling environment for development activities is the construction of a road from Ségou to Kidal, with funding from the European Union, which was inaugurated on 16 May and links areas that previously were very isolated.

41. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) continued its rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in Gao and Timbuktu. On 30 April, reconstruction of the two mausoleums in the Djingareyber mosque in Timbuktu was completed. MINUSMA also supported the Ministry of Culture in establishing an inventory of non-tangible cultural heritage in the four northern regions.

VII. Humanitarian situation

42. At the end of April, 3.6 million people were food insecure, including 1.5 million who were severely affected (half of whom are in the regions of Gao, Kidal, Mopti and Timbuktu). National authorities have been proactively addressing the food crisis with the support of humanitarian partners. The authorities have established a monitoring committee on food security comprised of national authorities and humanitarian actors to improve planning and coordination. Malnutrition continues to seriously affect the most vulnerable, with 496,000 children under the age of five facing a threefold to ninefold risk of mortality in 2014. The number of severely food insecure is expected to rise to 1.9 million by June. Through their common strategic response plan, humanitarian actors are seeking \$77 million for nutrition interventions and \$255 million for food aid and agricultural interventions in 2014. As at 13 May, these two sectors were only 9 and 21 per cent funded, respectively.

43. The number of internally displaced persons in Mali continues to decrease. According to the April 2014 displacement tracking matrix of the International

Organization for Migration (IOM), nearly 138,000 persons were internally displaced, compared with 350,000 at the height of displacement. However, back-and-forth movement and secondary displacements (people returning to urban centres but not to homes in rural areas) are also being recorded. Such factors have implications for security and access to education, land and property rights. As at 8 May, Burkina Faso, Mauritania and the Niger continue to host some 140,000 Malian refugees registered by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), compared with 177,000 at the height of displacement. A tripartite agreement signed between UNHCR, Mali and the Niger on 3 May lays the ground for the assisted repatriation of refugees.

44. The delivery of basic social services remains limited in areas of return, hindering the sustainability of return and posing a risk of inter-community tensions. This is particularly true for access to water, which is becoming increasingly difficult several months into the dry season and has already been a source of tension. Almost all health centres (90 per cent) are now functioning in the north, but many still depend largely on support from humanitarian partners to deliver services.

45. The recent incidents in Kidal resulted in limited displacement, with approximately 4,215 people fleeing to different areas in the regions of Kidal and Gao. Humanitarian actors responded to the priority needs of these persons in the areas of water, sanitation, hygiene, food, shelter and health care. Contingency stocks, including water bladders, tents and sanitation and hygiene supplies, were pre-positioned in Gao with the support of MINUSMA. Nine World Food Programme (WFP) trucks with 194 tons of food left Gao for Kidal on 25 May. Assistance has also been provided to approximately 60 displaced persons who sought refuge in the MINUSMA camp in Kidal.

46. As at 26 May, only 19.3 per cent of the \$568 million needed to fund the strategic response plan for Mali to meet humanitarian and early recovery needs had been received. Humanitarian partners face ever greater challenges to respond to identified needs and to any sudden-onset crisis.

VIII. Establishment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

47. As at 26 May, the military strength of MINUSMA stood at 8,280 personnel, including 52 women, representing 74 per cent of the authorized total of 11,200. MINUSMA is revising its force layout to reflect a greater concentration of personnel in northern Mali. During the reporting period, the Mission's military strength increased with the arrival of 1,837 troops, including an infantry battalion, which has temporarily been deployed in the staging area of Diabaly and will be transferred to Gao as soon as logistic and infrastructural arrangements permit. The headquarters of the All Sources Information Fusion Unit is being established at the Bamako airport, while a special forces unit and All Sources Information Fusion Unit assets are being deployed to Gao. The All Sources Information Fusion Unit will significantly enhance the Mission's situational awareness capability. Full deployment of a riverine unit and the redeployment of the two explosive ordnance disposal companies from the training area of Kati to their final locations in Gao and Timbuktu will further enhance the MINUSMA Force's operational capabilities.

48. With respect to medical capability, on 23 April, a level II hospital became operational in Gao, in addition to the level II hospital in Sévaré. Construction of the third level II military hospital in Timbuktu is under way. The Mission is improving its aeromedical evacuation capability through an arrangement with commercial providers.

49. Other critical enabling units that have now been deployed include three engineering companies, two signals companies, an airfield maintenance company and a transportation company. However, one of the engineering companies has been deployed without the majority of its equipment. While MINUSMA has now received four attack helicopters, it still lacks military utility helicopters, seriously hampering its air mobility. An infantry battalion, a reserve battalion, an airfield service unit, additional elements of the All Sources Information Fusion Unit, three utility helicopters units, an armed helicopter unit, a military police company and two force protection companies have all been generated but have not yet been deployed.

50. Efforts to transfer equipment sourced by the Trust Fund in Support of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) continued during the reporting period. To date, a total of 16 vehicles and 108 containers of field defence stores, accommodation units, generators and other supplies have been handed over to former AFISMA units. Many of these units have not yet met either United Nations unit standards or self-sustainment criteria. Eight vehicles and other equipment await distribution, pending acceptance by the troop-contributing countries concerned.

51. Multiple essential engineering and infrastructure projects are under way. These include horizontal works at five main bases (Gao, Kidal, Mopti, Tessalit and Timbuktu); a transit camp at the Bamako Senou airport; the construction of a parallel laterite runway in Gao; and the extension of the Kidal and Tessalit runways. Maintenance of runways in Gao, Kidal and Tessalit is ongoing. These activities are essential both to improve the Mission's capacity to absorb military, police and civilian personnel and to enhance the delivery of assets where they are required. In order to reduce its presence in Bamako, MINUSMA has relocated many support services from the temporary headquarters in Hotel l'Amitié to an interim logistics base about 5 kilometres away. The Mission is currently consulting with the Government of Mali to identify future Mission headquarters premises.

52. The Mission's police component has strengthened significantly, with 979 personnel, including 51 female officers, or 69 per cent of the authorized total of 1,440 police personnel having been deployed as at 26 May. The number of deployed individual police officers has risen to 122, or 38 per cent of the authorized 320. Six formed police units (857 personnel or 77 per cent of the authorized 1,120) remain on the ground.

53. As at 27 May, 469 of the authorized 672 civilian international staff have been deployed, 144, or 31 per cent of whom are women. Eighty-four of the authorized 145 United Nations volunteer positions have been filled, of whom 36 (43 per cent) are women. A total of 308 of the authorized 781 national staff members are on board, 78 (25 per cent) of whom are women.

IX. International coordination

54. On 28 and 29 March, my Special Representative attended the forty-fourth ordinary session of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Authority of Heads of State and Government, held in Yamoussoukro. The assembled Heads of State and Government applauded the return to constitutional order in Mali. They welcomed the signing of the modus operandi for the cantonment of armed groups and called for its full implementation by all parties to the preliminary agreement. They urged the Government of Mali to assume full responsibility for the conduct of an inclusive inter-Malian dialogue.

55. The coordination platform for the Sahel held its second meeting on 16 May in Bamako under the two-year rotating chairmanship of Mali. Participants endorsed the road map of the Malian presidency and renewed their commitment to enhance coordination and rationalize the allocation of resources for regional cooperation initiatives.

X. Financial aspects

56. The General Assembly, by its resolution 68/259 of 27 December 2013, appropriated the amount of \$602 million for the maintenance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014, inclusive of the amount of \$366.8 million previously authorized for the Mission for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2013 under the terms of its resolution 67/286.

57. The proposed budget for MINUSMA for the period 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015 in the amount of \$812.7 million has been submitted to the General Assembly for consideration during the second part of its resumed sixty-eighth session.

58. As at 2 June 2014, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for MINUSMA amounted to \$132.6 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to \$1,216.0 million.

59. As at 2 June 2014, troop/formed police costs had been reimbursed for the period up to 28 February 2014 and the costs of contingent-owned equipment had been reimbursed for the period up to 31 December 2013, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

XI. Strategic review of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

60. In anticipation of the Security Council's deliberations on the renewal of the mandate of MINUSMA, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations undertook a strategic review of the Mission, which included a visit to Mali from 4 to 9 May by a multidimensional team led by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. The purpose of this initiative was to review, one year after the establishment of MINUSMA, the basic assumptions behind the design of the Mission with a view to recommending possible changes to the mandate or to its implementation strategy in the light of significant developments since the authorization of the Mission. The team consulted with the Government, civil society both in Bamako and in the north, the leadership of armed groups signatories to the

preliminary agreement, international partners and many others. Consultations with key international and regional actors as well as troop- and police-contributing countries were also held at Headquarters.

61. The review concluded that the restoration of constitutional order, the sidelining of the junta behind the March 2012 coup and limited progress in the reconciliation process were the most significant political aspects of the evolution in the strategic context since April 2013. Despite these achievements, many important aspects of the stabilization of Mali, including most of the tasks included in the MINUSMA mandate, are yet to be accomplished. These relate, in particular, to the stabilization of the north and support for the restoration of State authority, human rights and the protection of civilians, and national and community reconciliation. Progress in all these areas remains tied to the political negotiations between the Government and armed groups, highlighting the central importance of progress in the political process for the achievement of the Mission's mandate.

62. The elected authorities have signalled their desire for national leadership of the political process, but limited progress has been made since September 2013. The Government's appointment of a High Representative for Inclusive Inter-Malian Dialogue may be cause for optimism, but there is no common vision at this time between the Government and armed groups on the way forward in the political process, including on the framework for negotiations, or on the agenda, timeline, participation and links with wider community dialogue. The recent clashes in Kidal and the resulting expansion of areas controlled by armed groups highlight the urgency of making progress in the political process.

63. At the local level, the humanitarian and security situation, including continued tensions between various communities throughout the north remain a significant source of concern. Governance issues such as corruption also remain a major driver of conflict in Mali and need to be addressed as part of a long-term stabilization strategy. Trafficking and transnational organized crime also remain significant enablers of insecurity throughout the north.

64. After initial improvements in 2013, the security situation in northern Mali has deteriorated since the beginning of 2014. The increase in incidents involving improvised explosive devices, mostly targeting Malian and international security forces, contribute to an overall sense of insecurity in the north. Contrary to initial assumptions, however, security risks to the population are mostly related to banditry and inter-communal violence, especially in areas of refugee and internally displaced person returns and along commercial axes. This insecurity impedes the return to normalcy and the resumption of economic and development activities.

65. Despite increasing its presence in the north in the past year, the review found that MDSF remains hampered by serious capacity gaps and will continue to require international assistance for the foreseeable future. MINUSMA may be called upon to play a larger role in this area, in particular as Operation Serval draws down in Mali and shifts to a regional posture. Until MDSF is able to assume counter-terrorism tasks, initial assumptions on the need for a parallel force to address the continued presence of terrorist groups in northern Mali will remain valid. Operation Serval appears to be intent on continuing to play this role, albeit in a new configuration.

66. To date, the Mission's strategy in support of security and stabilization has focused on a static presence in main population centres in line with Security Council resolution 2100 (2013). The current situation requires adjustments so that the Malian security forces and MINUSMA progressively dominate areas adjacent to population centres, including commercial axes, in order to deny access to terrorist groups and criminals. The Mission's insufficient mobility and air cover hamper these efforts. The Mission is developing a revised force laydown that proposes the gradual redeployment of most MINUSMA assets and may extend the Mission to a number of additional locations north of the Niger River belt. Plans in that regard, however, exceed the Mission's current construction and support capacity, which is focused on developing bases in the major deployment locations in accordance with early planning. Staff safety and security also remain major concerns given the sustained threat to United Nations personnel and others from asymmetric attacks, improvised explosive devices and kidnappings. Consequently, the Mission's ability to deploy civilian staff, including support personnel, and to build, staff and maintain additional deployment locations in remote areas will be severely constrained. Should the parties demonstrate a concrete commitment to the cantonment process, which will be essential for the success of the political process, the Mission must also be prepared to fully support cantonment. This will, however, have additional support implications.

67. During discussions with the review team, Government officials proposed to enhance coordination systems between MDSF and MINUSMA and requested that MINUSMA provide operational support to MDSF in northern Mali. Noting that increased MDSF capacity to secure Mali's territory remains at the centre of the Mission's projected end-state in the security area, the team endorsed proposals for enhanced coordination and duly noted the request for operational support. Further analysis of risks and opportunities, in particular with regard to the potential impact of providing operational support to MDSF on the political process, would be required before making a detailed recommendation to the Security Council on this issue.

68. Redeployment of the administration and State services remains relatively weak throughout the northern regions, undermining the legitimacy of the State among the local population and fuelling continued instability. During the strategic review, all interlocutors emphasized the need for increased emphasis on such stabilization priorities as improved security at the subregional level, restoration of the penal chain and increased access to basic services as critical for the return of refugees and internally displaced persons and the resumption of normal economic activity.

69. As Mali enters the next phase of the stabilization process, the need for the Mission and national authorities to synchronize their activities more closely will become increasingly important. All aspects of the Mission's mandate require coordinated action by Government actors, highlighting the need for closer cooperation on the basis of a joint vision.

70. On the basis of this assessment, the strategic review resulted in the following recommendations for adjustments to the Mission's mandate:

(a) The Security Council should reiterate that the political process, as agreed to by the parties in the Ouagadougou preliminary agreement of 18 June 2013, remains the cornerstone of the implementation of the mandate, and reframe the

Mission's political role as one that includes "good offices and facilitation support" for the process, including coordination of regional and international initiatives;

(b) The Malian authorities should develop a shared vision for the way forward with MINUSMA, outlining their respective responsibilities with regard to all aspects of mandate implementation, and formulate "benchmarks" to be approved by the Security Council;

(c) The Mission's current troop and police ceiling should be maintained and the Mission should expand its static and mobile presence in the north, within its means and capabilities, as part of an integrated stabilization strategy in the context of asymmetric threats, to be coordinated with the expansion of the presence of national institutions and partners and synchronized with progress in the political process;

(d) MINUSMA should be authorized, in response to the request of the Malian authorities, to provide support for the organization and conduct of local elections and electoral reform in the context of decentralization, as well as support for transitional and military justice and capacity-building of Malian law enforcement agencies in counter-trafficking. The Security Council may also wish to consider requesting MINUSMA to explore means of enhancing coordination with MDSF, subject to an assessment of risks and in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy.

71. The review also recommended continuing efforts to transfer the Mission's centre of gravity to the north while acknowledging that the expansion of the Mission's footprint in the north would need to be planned and sequenced in full consideration of the financial, support and security constraints faced by MINUSMA.

XII. Observations

72. I am deeply concerned at the dramatic turn of events in Mali since 17 May. The resumption of hostilities and the situation in the northern part of the country constitute a clear and unacceptable violation of the letter and spirit of the preliminary agreement of 18 June 2013. The continued occupation of parts of the north by armed groups is also a serious breach of the preliminary agreement.

73. I welcome the ceasefire agreement signed by the Government of Mali and the armed groups, facilitated by the Chair of the African Union, President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz of Mauritania, and my Special Representative, Albert Gerard Koenders. I call upon all parties to strictly respect its terms. The hostilities have resulted in an altered security landscape in the north of Mali, with risks for international security. This situation cannot endure. The United Nations remains firmly committed to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali and to active support for the implementation of the preliminary agreement, including the holding of an inclusive dialogue.

74. As an immediate priority, the ceasefire agreement must be fully respected and the institutions of the preliminary agreement, in particular the Monitoring and Evaluation Committee and the Mixed Technical Commission on Security, reinstalled without delay and accepted by all parties concerned. I trust that the revival of this machinery will help to elaborate the modalities for the ceasefire and the way forward. My Special Representative and MINUSMA stand ready to support the

implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the relaunch of the peace process in line with the preliminary agreement.

75. There can be no durable solution to the security challenges in the north without a political process that paves the way for the full restoration of law and order, equal access by all Malians to public services, and reconciliation between communities. All parties must act on their recommitment to uphold the preliminary agreement as the framework for discussions leading to the launching, in earnest, of a formal, inclusive political dialogue without delay. I am deeply concerned that in the absence of a political process, terrorist groups will seize opportunities to target Malian and international forces and threaten civilians in the north. Even before the recent resumption of hostilities, rocket and improvised explosive device attacks spread fear and slowed the reconciliation process.

76. I condemn the atrocities committed in the course of the recent hostilities, in particular the killing of eight civilians, including six civil servants, by armed groups in Kidal. I express my condolences to the families of the victims. The perpetrators of these heinous crimes should be identified and brought to justice. An international commission of inquiry, as agreed by the parties to the ceasefire agreement, should be put in place as soon as possible to establish the facts. The United Nations is prepared to provide the expertise and technical support needed to establish such a commission.

77. The Government of Mali, under the leadership of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, has primary responsibility for resolving the challenges facing Mali and protecting civilians throughout the country. As an essential first step, the parties to the conflict must abandon the logic of war and commit to the peace process. Only when this process is "Malian-owned" will durable solutions to the conflict be possible. I urge the Government, the armed groups and all civil society actors to redouble their efforts to work together in earnest, in close cooperation with my Special Representative, to bring about a process that delivers on the hopes of the Malian people. The status quo is not acceptable. The achievements made since 2013, including the successful presidential and legislative elections and a gradual return of State administration to the north, demonstrate the desire of all Malians to re-establish a strong and vibrant nation. Recent tragic events make it all the more important to proceed without delay towards an inclusive dialogue process that brings all Malians together around a set of collectively agreed issues that need to be addressed to achieve a final peace settlement. I hope that the appointment by President Keïta of a High Representative to facilitate peace discussions will give fresh impetus to such efforts.

78. The multiple initiatives by countries in the region to support the political process, under the impulse of the Malian authorities and their partners, clearly demonstrate the region's concern about continued instability in Mali. I urge all actors engaged in such initiatives to seek greater coherence in these efforts in close coordination with the United Nations. My Special Representative will continue to use his good offices to proactively assist the reconciliation and negotiation processes.

79. The armed groups must negotiate in good faith and without delay. I welcome all efforts, including by regional actors, aimed at creating synergies and coherence among and between the armed movements in order to bring about meaningful, effective negotiations with the Government. All Malians participating in this process

must do so in full respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Mali. A consensus among all parties on the parameters and timeline for peace talks is required in order to put in place an effective cantonment process, which remains their responsibility. These efforts will require the sustained support of the international community.

80. In my previous report, I welcomed the establishment of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission. I reiterate my call for the Government to ensure the neutral, impartial and independent functioning of this body. I am also encouraged by the ongoing judicial investigations and hearings on a number of high-profile cases, including the case of the red berets and the mutiny in Kati. These efforts — provided they are sustained — are important positive steps in the fight against impunity. Yet, I am concerned that despite some initial progress, the re-establishment of the presence and functioning of the judiciary and of State administration throughout the country suffered a significant blow following the recent resumption of hostilities.

81. I am also troubled by the continued food insecurity and malnutrition in Mali. I call upon the international partners of Mali to fund the shortfall in the humanitarian appeal.

82. I would encourage the Security Council, in its deliberations on the renewal of the Mission's mandate, to consider the results of the strategic review and related recommendations, outlined in paragraphs 70 and 71 above, regarding the need to: (a) adjust the Mission's political role, while ensuring that the political process remains the cornerstone of mandate implementation; (b) develop joint benchmarks for mandate implementation as part of efforts to improve the synchronization of activities; (c) maintain the current troop and police ceiling, while expanding the Mission's footprint in the north beyond major population centres as part of an integrated stabilization strategy, subject to security and logistical constraints and; (d) add mandated tasks for support to local elections, transitional justice, capacity-building for counter-trafficking and, subject to an assessment of risks and in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy, enhanced coordination with MDSF. I recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of MINUSMA at its current authorized uniformed strength of up to 11,200 military personnel and 1,440 police personnel for a period of one year, until 1 July 2015. In the meantime, I urge all States that have pledged uniformed personnel and assets to MINUSMA or are providing support to troop- and police-contributing countries to accelerate the arrival in the Mission of personnel and materiel still awaiting deployment.


83. Implementation of the adjustments to the mandate suggested above will be extremely challenging for the Mission, given the serious support and security constraints it faces. In that regard, the Mission's support and construction capacities will need to be strengthened. It will be necessary to prioritize efforts and recognize that extended timelines for the completion of existing and new projects will be needed and that implementation will be costly.

84. Sustained political engagement by the Security Council remains essential to rapidly advance the political process. A coherent approach by Mali's bilateral partners and international financial institutions to achieve progress in areas that are critical to the stabilization of the country, in particular with regard to governance and political negotiations, will also be essential for successful mandate implementation.

85. Lastly, I wish to pay tribute to my Special Representative for Mali, Albert Gerard Koenders, and the uniformed personnel and civilian staff of MINUSMA for their continued hard work under extremely difficult circumstances. I also thank all troop- and police-contributing countries, the African Union, ECOWAS, the European Union and bilateral partners, United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, non-governmental organizations and all other partners for their important contributions to supporting the peace process in Mali.

Annex I

MINUSMA deployment map



Annex II

**United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in Mali: military and police strength as at
31 May 2014**

Country	Military component			Police component		
	Military staff officers and units			Individual police officers and formed police units		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Bangladesh	1 444	4	1 448	139	0	139
Benin	257	0	257	9	1	10
Burkina Faso	854	10	864	11	1	12
Burundi	0	0	0	4	0	4
Cambodia	307	4	311	0	0	0
Cameroon	0	0	0	6	0	6
Canada	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chad	1 138	0	1 138	7	0	7
Channel Islands	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chile	0	0	0	0	0	0
China	389	12	401	0	0	0
Côte d'Ivoire	125	0	125	6	0	6
Democratic Republic of the Congo	0	0	0	3	1	4
Denmark	42	2	44	0	0	0
Dominican Republic	1	1	2	0	0	0
Egypt	0	0	0	2	0	2
Estonia	1	0	1	0	0	0
Finland	1	0	1	0	0	0
France	18	1	19	5	0	5
Gambia	2	0	2	0	0	0
Germany	59	3	62	4	1	5
Ghana	160	0	160	1	0	1
Guinea	169	0	169	1	1	2
Guinea-Bissau	2	0	2	0	0	0
Italy	2	0	2	0	0	0
Jordan	1	0	1	2	0	2
Kenya	1	0	1	0	0	0
Liberia	49	0	49	0	0	0
Madagascar	0	0	0	2	0	2
Mauritania	4	0	4	0	0	0
Nepal	145	4	149	0	0	0
Netherlands	515	7	522	12	0	12

Country	Military component			Police component		
	Military staff officers and units			Individual police officers and formed police units		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Niger	860	5	865	6	1	7
Nigeria	117	1	118	119	26	145
Norway	31	0	31	0	0	0
Rwanda	6	0	6	125	17	142
Senegal	600	2	602	283	1	284
Sierra Leone	5	0	5	0	0	0
Sweden	5	0	5	2	1	3
Switzerland	1	0	1	0	1	1
Togo	934	3	937	155	0	155
Tunisia	0	0	0	1	0	1
Turkey	0	0	0	6	0	6
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2	0	2	0	0	0
United States of America	10	0	10	0	0	0
Yemen	5	0	5	5	0	5
Total	8 262	59	8 321	916	52	968



Security Council

Distr.: General
20 June 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 20 June 2014 from the Chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission addressed to the President of the Security Council

In my capacity as Chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission, I visited Brussels (European Union, Belgium), Paris, Bujumbura, Kigali and Arusha (East African Community) from 21 to 31 May 2014. I had the opportunity to talk at length with various national and international stakeholders on the situation in Burundi from a peacebuilding perspective. The attached report* summarizes the conversations and meetings that I held during my visit.

I kindly ask you to circulate the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Paul R. Seger
Chair of the Burundi configuration of the
Peacebuilding Commission

* The report was made available to the members of the Security Council only.





Security Council

Distr.: General
12 June 2014

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 9 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations stating that Mr. Steven Hill has been appointed alternate representative of the United Kingdom on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.



**General Assembly
Security Council**Distr.: General
16 June 2014

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda items 42 and 69 (b)**Security Council**
Sixty-ninth year**Question of Cyprus****Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights questions, including alternative approaches for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms****Letter dated 12 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to bring to your attention a judgement delivered on 12 May 2014 by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, awarding just satisfaction in the case of *Cyprus v. Turkey* (application No. 25781/94). It is the first time in the Court's history that monetary just satisfaction is awarded to a claimant State. The Court granted a record €90 million in non-pecuniary damages in respect of missing persons and their relatives, the enclaved Greek Cypriot residents of the Karpas peninsula and the displaced Greek Cypriot property owners.

The Court further stressed that, in addition to the award of just satisfaction, Turkey continues to have an obligation to take measures to put an end to the violations found by the Court and to redress their effects.

It is recalled that the Court, in its original judgement delivered in 2001, held that there were ongoing, numerous, grave and massive violations of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by Turkey arising out of its military invasion of 1974 and continuing occupation of the northern part of Cyprus. The original judgement also concluded that the activities of the secessionist entity in the occupied areas are those of Turkey's subordinate and unlawful local administration, whose actions and omissions engage the legal responsibility of Turkey.

In its judgement of 12 May on the issue of just satisfaction with respect to the original case, the Court found that:

(a) The claim to just satisfaction cannot be extinguished or nullified by the passage of time;



(b) In relation to the relatives of the missing persons, the Court found that they endured decades of not knowing the fates of their loved ones and the non-pecuniary award serves to give recognition to the fact that moral damage occurred as a result of a breach of a fundamental human right;

(c) In relation to the enclaved residents of the Karpas peninsula, the Court affirmed that they undergo multiple violations of their human rights, which cause protracted feelings of helplessness, distress and anxiety;

(d) In relation to the Greek Cypriot owners of property in the occupied areas, Turkey continues to have the obligation not to permit, participate, acquiesce or otherwise be complicit in any unlawful sale or exploitation of Greek Cypriot homes and property in the northern part of Cyprus;

(e) The original judgement of 2001 continues to be in effect in relation to the persisting violations of property rights by Turkey, since Greek Cypriot property owners in northern Cyprus are being denied access to and control, use and enjoyment of their property as well as compensation for the interference with their property rights;

(f) Turkey remains free to choose the means by which it will discharge its legal obligation vis-à-vis the Greek Cypriot property owners in the occupied areas. In this respect, the Court noted that the "Immovable Property Commission" does not absolve Turkey of this obligation.

This decision makes it, once again, unequivocally clear that the passage of time does not legitimize any fait accompli arising from Turkey's invasion of Cyprus and continuing occupation. It does not compromise existing rights, nor does it mitigate their violations or absolve their perpetrator of responsibility.

Res ipsa loquitur (the matter speaks for itself)!

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 42 and 69 (b), and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nicholas Emiliou
Permanent Representative

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
13 June 2014
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 13 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I wish to draw your attention to the following information:

In the light of the Syrian people's belief in its national unity, its tenacious defence of its independence and sovereignty and the provisions of the Constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic, presidential elections were held on 3 June 2014. Ballots were cast before that date at embassies of the Syrian Arab Republic. For the first time in Syria's history, the elections offered a choice between several candidates. The voting took place in a climate of competition, equality, freedom of expression and restraint. In accordance with the law, the Syrian State was completely impartial towards the three candidates. Observers representing the three candidates were present during the voting, when the ballots were opened and when the results were announced. The electoral process was monitored by representatives of numerous States, parliaments, electoral committees and non-governmental organizations. It was covered by over one hundred media outlets from a range of countries and continents. The elections were supervised, scrutinized and monitored by a high judicial committee supported by subcommittees in each governorate.

The elections took place at the constitutionally-prescribed time across the Syrian Arab Republic and abroad. The climate was one of democracy and transparency, and the popular response exceeded expectations. According to Syrian State records, 15,845,575 Syrians at home and abroad were eligible to vote; 11,634,412 of them, or 73.42 per cent, did so. There were 442,108 invalid ballots, or 3.8 per cent of the total. The candidate Dr. Bashar Hafez al-Assad won 10,319,723 votes, or 88.7 per cent of the valid ballots. Dr. Hassan Abdullah al-Nuri won 500,279 votes, or 4.3 per cent of valid ballots. Mr. Mahir Abdulhafiz Hajjar won 372,301 votes, or 3.2 per cent of valid ballots.

In statements issued independently, Mr. Nuri and Mr. Hajjar said that they accepted the results that had been announced and respected the decision of the Syrian people. They emphasized that the elections had been fair and honest.

The Syrian people has affirmed that it is the only party entitled to express an opinion on matters of sovereignty and constitutionality in the country. Syria faces a number of challenges, particularly the terrorist onslaught backed by certain States that are purportedly democratic and others whose entire history has yet to witness an



election. Nevertheless, the Syrian people turned out in full view of the world to exercise its right to choose its president. The terrorist organizations and the so-called moderate armed opposition had threatened to rain down thousands of missiles and mortar shells on the voting stations. Even though those threats were carried out, the Syrian people turned out in its millions, defying all obstacles to elect a president in accordance with the finest legal and electoral standards. Yet instead of encouraging and supporting that historic experience, certain of the States that have attacked Syria's role and position sought to thwart the election. In so doing, they contravened all democratic values and notions and the principles of human rights and freedom of expression and vote. Their purpose was to misrepresent the civilized nature of the Syrian people. Indeed, some of those States fought against the democratic process by preventing the holding of elections at Syrian embassies, in violation of international law and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

All of the claims proffered by certain States regarding the elections have now been disproved. The elections took place all over Syria. The turnout exceeded that of the countries whose leaders claimed that the situation in Syria would make voting impossible. The allegation that the elections could hinder a peaceful solution to the crisis in Syria has also proved false. The Syrian people voted for electoral programmes that largely stressed the need to bring Syria out of its current situation, particularly by confronting terrorism and violence and reaching a peaceful solution through an intra-Syrian, Syrian-led dialogue aimed at rebuilding what the terrorists have destroyed and restoring normal life to what used to be one of the safest and most stable countries in the Middle East and the world.

The Syrian Constitution and the relevant laws have been followed, and the international community must respect the desire of the Syrian people to choose its leaders and determine its present and future. The international community must stand with the Syrian people by combating terrorism and prevailing on those States that openly arm, fund and shelter terrorist groups to refrain from doing so. Moreover, the terrorists whom certain States have used in order to attack Syria have now begun to turn against them.

Through these elections, the great Syrian people has proved that it is patriotic and law-abiding. It is high time for those States that are involved in shedding Syrian blood and arming and funding terrorists to recognize the right of the Syrian people to live in security and peace.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Bashar Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative